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GAME THEORETIC AND CONTRACTARIAN
PARADIGMS IN THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN REGULATORS AND
REGULATORY LAWYERS
Richard W. Painter*
EGAL scholars use several different theoretical paradigms to de-
scribe the regulatory process, including capture theory' and public
choice theory.2 Sometimes, but not often, the role of lawyers is in-
cluded in the analysis.3 This Article examines relationships between
regulators, regulated firms, and lawyers from the vantage point of two
other theoretical paradigms: game theory' and Coasian contractual
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon; Visiting Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Illinois (1996); B.A. Harvard University, 1984; J.D. Yale Uni-
versity, 1987. I wish to thank Ted Schneyer, Russell Korobkin, and Jennifer Duggan
for helpful comments on prior drafts of this Article.
1. Capture theory models the process by which regulated industries influence
rule making and enforcement processes through their "capture" of regulators. See
Paul J. Quirk, Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies (1981); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L Rev. 421 (1987); John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L Rev. 713
(1986).
2. Public choice theory explains statutes and regulations as the result of compet-
ing interest groups influencing the rule making process. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice (1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987). An alternative "public
purpose" theory of interpretation perceives rule making as a collective process that
produces rational rules because checks and balances keep special interests from exert-
ing excessive influence. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (1994).
3. See, eg., Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing
the Law, 23 J. Legal Stud. 807 (1994) (applying public choice model in which lawyers
lobby for legal rules that increase their business just as other interest groups lobby
legislators). Roberta Romano also explored the possibility of capture of regulators by
lawyers, possibly even to the detriment of their clients:
The targets of the SEC's [Securities and Exchange Commission] disclosure
policy are primarily corporate issuers, and most corporations oppose the reg-
ulation. However, foes of the SEC, applying the insight of the capture the-
ory, perceive the regulatory scheme to benefit security analysts, lawyers, and
accountants, and neither investors nor firms. In this regard, the private insti-
tutions that bridge the information gap could be the principal beneficiaries
and supporters of the disclosure laws.
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 1003
(1984).
4. Relevant literature on game theory includes: Robert M. Axelrod, The Emer-
gence of Cooperation (1984); Douglas G. Baird et al, Game Theory and the Law
(1994); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Trole, Game Theory (1991); Diego Gambetta, Trust:
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (1988); David M. Kreps, Corporate Cul-
ture and Economic Theory, Perspectives On Positive Political Economy (James Alt &
Kenneth Shepsle, eds. 1990); David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Model-
ling (1990) [hereinafter Kreps, Game Theory]; Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Co-
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theory.5 First, this Article looks at the work of regulatory lawyers as
part of a series of "games" between regulators, regulated firms and
lawyers, all of whom in this context will be referred to as "players."
Next, this Article examines the interaction between these players
through a contractarian lens and discusses the possibilities for "bar-
gaining" between them. Neither of these two theoretical paradigms
completely describes the relationship between lawyers and regulators,
or all of the ways in which that relationship could evolve. Both are
useful analytical tools, however, and offer valuable insights into con-
flicts between lawyers and regulators which seem to be occurring with
increasing frequency. A central thesis of this Article is that because
lawyers representing agencies and lawyers representing firms play the
"regulatory game" with each other on a frequent basis and have op-
portunities to bargain, cooperative play between them can create sub-
stantial benefits for both. Such cooperative play between lawyers, if it
evolves, is likely to foster cooperative play between agencies and reg-
ulated firms as well.
I. WHO SHOULD REGULATE LAWYERS AND How?
A. Choosing Regulators
David Wilkins has brought to the forefront of scholarly debate the
problem of determining who should regulate the legal profession. His
article Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,6 explores four paradigmatic
approaches to enforcing professional norms: disciplinary controls,7
operation (1987); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, 50
Econometrica 863 (1982). For examples of applications of game theory to legal
problems, see Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 387 (1991); Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competi-
tion, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 285 (1991).
5. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Chaos
theory is another theoretical paradigm that has recently been juxtaposed to Coasian
contractual theory and other concepts associated with law and economics. See James
Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (1988). "Chaos here does not mean disorder,
but that accurate predictions about where a system is headed are hard." Mark J. Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 642 (1996).
Although this Article does not use chaos theory, it does address the chaos that many
lawyers perceive in a system where it is difficult to predict how regulators will respond
to a given course of lawyer conduct. Hopefully, the game theory and Coasian con-
tractual theory discussed here can assist lawyers and regulators in establishing some
order and predictability in their relationship.
6. 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1992).
7. "The reference point for this model is the current disciplinary system, in which
independent agencies acting under the supervision of state supreme courts investigate
and prosecute violations of the rules of professional conduct." Id. at 805. The basic
structure resembles a criminal prosecution, the process is conducted ex post by offi-
cials with no prior involvement in the case, and the focus is on punishment and deter-
rence, not compensation. Id. at 805-06.
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liability controls,8 institutional controls,9 and legislative controls.'"
This Article explores the third of these approaches, institutional con-
trols, and gives specific attention to the role of state and federal agen-
cies in regulating lawyers.
Wilkins mentions several advantages of institutional controls. Insti-
tutional enforcement authorities may observe lawyer misconduct di-
rectly" and have incentives to enforce lawyers' obligations to the legal
system.' 2 Furthermore, because enforcement officials and lawyers
often are in a continuing relationship, sanctions can be both more im-
mediate and more meaningful.' 3 A danger exists, however, that en-
forcement officials will go overboard and "overdeter" conduct that is
generally perceived by the bar to be acceptable. 14
Many of Wilkins's generalizations about institutional controls are
pertinent to regulation of lawyers by agencies whose primary focus is
regulation of the lawyers' clients. Regulators are uniquely positioned
to discover lawyer misconduct, particularly in more complex practice
areas such as banking and securities regulation. Regulators have an
incentive to initiate enforcement proceedings against recalcitrant law-
yers. Regulators also can overreact.' 5 Thus, it is important to ex-
amine how regulatory agencies establish and enforce professional
conduct norms, and how lawyers respond, before deciding how much
authority these agencies should have in regulating the legal profes-
sion. Game theoretic paradigms explain some of this interaction be-
tween agencies and lawyers and are useful tools for predicting how
their relationship might evolve if agencies were given an enhanced
role in regulating lawyers.
8. This model is based on litigation brought by injured clients and third parties
against lawyers for "breaching ethical duties." I&. at 807. "Like the disciplinary
model, liability controls operate on the basis of ex post complaints by injured parties.
A victorious claimant, however, is entitled to full compensatory and even punitive
damages." Id.
9. Institutional controls "share a common goal: to locate enforcement authority
inside the institutions in which lawyers work. As a result, the structure and operation
of any particular system will be primarily a function of the institution within which it
is situated." Id. at 808. Examples of such institutions include the courts, the SEC, the
Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), and the Internal Revenue Services ("IRS"). Id.
10. Although not yet implemented, this model contemplates establishing a new
administrative agency to regulate lawyers. Such an agency "might be patterned after
the agencies that currently regulate doctors in many states." Id. at 808.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 837.
13. See id. at 808, 836-37.
14. Id. at 837.
15. Many lawyers believe that the OTS overreacted to alleged lawyer misconduct
in the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. See infra note 139. The SEC's proceed-
ings against lawyers, alleged to have caused client noncompliance with the disclosure
requirements of the securities laws, have also been sharply criticized. See infra note
139.
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B. Choosing Rules and Remedies
David Wilkins has challenged the assumption that all lawyers
should be bound by the same rules and has emphasized the impor-
tance of context in formulating rules of professional conduct.16 Judge
Sporkin has also suggested that rules of professional conduct should
differ for different practice areas. 17 Some rules of professional con-
duct, for example, may be appropriate for criminal litigation 18 but not
for transactional lawyering.
One advantage of using regulators to regulate lawyers is that spe-
cialized agencies are familiar with the context in which lawyer conduct
rules apply. Regulatory agencies are thus more likely to accommo-
date differences between practice areas than disciplinary committees
or other institutions charged with regulating lawyers in many practice
areas. Also, regulatory agencies usually have more flexibility in craft-
ing remedies than state disciplinary authorities, which often cannot
impose substantial monetary sanctions, bar lawyers from certain fields
of practice, or impose structural remedies on law firms.' 9
Furthermore, as discussed later in this Article, contractarian theory
underscores unique opportunities that regulatory agencies have to in-
fluence lawyer conduct ex ante (before alleged misconduct occurs)
rather than merely discipline lawyers ex post.20 Agencies can work
with lawyers in a specific practice area to fashion mutually agreeable
rules of professional conduct that resemble a "contract" between the
agency and lawyers rather than an immutable set of standards im-
posed from above. One advantage of this contractual approach is that
16. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1151-60 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins, Regulating Law-
yers After Kaye, Scholer]; see also David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 468, 515-24 (1990) (stating that focus on context must replace the tradi-
tional model's commitment to universal ethical rules) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Re-
alism for Lawyers].
17. See Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for
the Various Specialties, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 149, 149 (1993).
.18. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics In The Practice Of Law 150 (1978)
("The central ideas in the legal profession's code of ethics originally arose out of crim-
inal cases, particularly the defense of criminal cases.").
19. Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis
Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 639, 645-50 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Schneyer, Bar Corporatism]; see also Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline For
Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1991) (suggesting that disciplinary authori-
ties have not had jurisdiction over law firms in the past). By contrast, the SEC can
suspend an entire law firm under Rule 2(e). See Securities Act Release No. 5,147
[1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,064 (May 10, 1971), cited and
discussed in, Robert W. Emerson, Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplining of Attorneys
Since In re Carter, 29 Am. Bus. L. J. 155, 157 n.4 (1991).
20. Lawyer discipline is generally a reactive process, although lawyer supervision
by regulators can be prospective. Schneyer, Bar Corporatism, supra note 19, at 643-45,
648-50. "The reactive nature of lawyer discipline may help to explain why state disci-
plinary agencies were in no position before the S&L failures to halt any law-firm
practices that jeopardized the soundness of thrift clients." 1d. at 645.
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both default rules, rules that parties may contract around, and tailored
rules, rules agreed to by lawyers and agencies to substitute for default
rules, are likely to be clear and easy to follow. Immutable rules, by
contrast, can be remarkably unclear if they emerge from uneasy com-
promise among different constituencies which cannot agree on what a
lawyer's responsibilities are.
II. THE GAME THEORETIC PARADIGM
Significant scholarship exists which relates game theory to the work
of the regulatory state,21 as well as to lawyers' roles in negotiations
and litigation strategy. 2 There is, however, little discussion of
"games" between regulators, regulated firms and lawyers. This Arti-
cle expands upon existing paradigms of games between regulators and
regulated industry by introducing new "players," the lawyers who rep-
resent both regulatory agencies and regulated firms.
A. Agency/Firm Games
Ian Ayres's and John Braithwaite's book, Responsive Regulation, is
a comprehensive application of a game theoretic model to interaction
between regulatory agencies and regulated firms. Nonetheless, their
discussion does not emphasize the role of regulatory lawyers. After
discussing the game theoretic model used by Ayres and Braithwaite,
this Article will speculate as to how this model might look once law-
yers representing both regulators and regulated firms are injected into
the game.
Ayres and Braithwaite use a game that was first modeled by John
Scholz in his work on interaction between regulatory agencies and
regulated firms.23 Scholz's game in turn is modeled on the classic
"prisoner's dilemma" game.24 While Ayres and Braithwaite use
21. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate (1992); John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecol-
ogy of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 Law & Soc'y Rev. 179 (1984); John T. Scholz,
Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Policy, 6 Law & Pol'y 385 (1984) [hereinafter
Scholz, Voluntary Compliance].
22. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Co-
operation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L Rev. 509 (1994).
Gilson and Mnookin use "the prisoner's dilemma as a heuristic to ... describe a
litigation game in which each disputant faces a single choice: she can either cooperate
by volunteering all relevant information to the other side or defect by using the dis-
covery process in an adversarial manner to hide unfavorable information." Id. at 512.
Gilson and Mnookin first examine this game "in an abstract world in which there are
no lawyers," and then "explore the role that lawyers might play in overcoming the
prisoner's dilemma." Id. Their theoretical framework is followed by discussion of an
informal survey of San Francisco matrimonial lawyers that "strongly suggests that the
relationship between lawyers known to each other to have cooperative, problem-solv-
ing orientations facilitates dispute resolution." Id. at 546.
23. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance, supra note 21, at 385.
24. The basic prisoner's dilemma problem involves the following hypothetical:
Two men commit armed robbery and are arrested on weapons charges. Both suspects
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Scholz's model of enforcement of environmental laws, this Article
uses a similar model of enforcement of depository institution regula-
tions. The payoffs for the agency are easier to quantify in the deposi-
tory institution model, increased safety and soundness of a regulated
institution brings expected savings to the insurance fund,2 5 but the
modelling of strategies for the firm and agency is similar in both
models.
In this game, modeled in Figure 1, regulated firms choose between
two strategies, "compliance" with regulators or "evasion." Firms that
choose to comply conform their conduct to the letter of the law as well
as the underlying objectives of regulation. 6 Firms that choose to
are held in separate rooms where they cannot talk to each other. The district attorney
approaches one of the suspects and says, "We know that you robbed the bank. If you
testify against your friend we will let you go free and your friend will get 15 years; if
you don't we have enough to get you on a weapons charge and you will get one year
in jail." The prisoner of course asks, "What's the catch?" The district attorney re-
plies, "The catch is that we are offering the same deal to your friend and if both of you
turn in the other, both of you will get 10 years for armed robbery." This is the essence
of the basic prisoner's dilemma problem. Each person has to decide how to play
based only on how she thinks the other person will play. This game is usually
modeled as follows:
Prisoner B
Silence Talk
Prisoner A Silence 1,1 15,0
Talk 0,15 10,10
Example 1.
The first number refers to prisoner A's payoff. The second number refers to prisoner
B's payoff. The game starts in the upper left hand quadrant. What will normally
happen when neither party has colluded beforehand is that both prisoners will decide
to talk and they will both end up getting 10 years.
Although the prisoner's dilemma game is a useful paradigm for Scholz's analysis of
interaction between agencies and firms and is used in the Ayres and Braithwaite anal-
ysis, it is important to recognize that other games could provide interesting insights
into interaction between firms and regulators:
[O]ne always wants to examine the strategic elements in a given situation
and avoid being drawn too quickly to a well-known paradigm such as the
prisoner's dilemma. Such paradigms can become Procrustean beds, and, by
rushing to one or another too quickly, one may miss important parts of a
problem.
Baird, supra note 4, at 45. Nonetheless, the analysis in this Article will follow Ayres
and Braithwaite in using the prisoner's dilemma game, while recognizing that other
paradigms may offer equally important insights and should perhaps be the subject of
further study.
25. A financial institution that fails imposes substantial expense on the insurance
fund. For a single institution, the payoff to the insurance fund from increased safety
and soundness can be estimated ex ante (if certain measures are implemented the
chance of failure drops from x% to y%; the cost of failure is Z; the expected savings
to the fund is (x-y)% multiplied by Z).
26. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 60. Former OTS Chief Counsel Harris
Weinstein has promoted the concept of practicing the "whole law," or determining
whether transactions that may be legal when viewed in isolation together threaten an
institution's safety or soundness. The attorney for a depository institution, Weinstein
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evade comply only with the letter of the law if forced to and ignore
the objectives of regulation. In like manner, regulatory agencies
choose between "cooperative" and "deterrence" enforcement strate-
gies. A cooperative enforcement strategy involves less regulatory
scrutiny and monitoring, and the agency tolerates some technical vio-
lations of regulations.2 7 A deterrence enforcement strategy, on the
other hand, involves vigorous regulatory scrutiny and zero tolerance
for regulatory violations.28
The firm gets the highest "temptation" payoff, only a $1 million cost
of compliance, labeled "opportunism" in Figure 1, if (i) it chooses an
evasion strategy and (ii) the agency chooses a cooperation strategy
and gets stuck with the lowest "sucker" payoff, only a $50 million ex-
pected savings to the insurance fund from the firm's compliance.
Conversely, the agency gets the "temptation" payoff, labeled "harass-
ment" in Figure 1, of being able to extract the highest level of regula-
tory compliance 9 if (i) it chooses a deterrence strategy and (ii) the
firm chooses a compliance strategy, which leaves the firm stuck with
the lowest "sucker" payoff. Between these two extremes are the "re-
ward" payoff, labeled "voluntary compliance" in Figure 1, that both
players receive if the agency chooses a cooperative strategy while the
firm chooses a compliance strategy, and the lower "punishment" pay-
off (labeled "legalistic battles" in Figure 1) that both players receive if
the agency chooses a deterrence strategy while the firm chooses an
evasion strategy. For each player, the payoffs are such that temptation
urges, must measure "his or her true obligations by reference to regulatory require-
ments, concepts of safety and soundness, and fiduciary responsibilities." Advice on
How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein Says, 56 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 616 (April 1, 1991).
One of the most powerful implications of the 'whole law' theory is that
banking lawyers may have to instruct officers and directors of federally in-
sured depository institutions to avoid 'unsafe and unsound' banking prac-
tices in fulfillment of an asserted fiduciary duty to act in the interests of
depositors and the federal government.
Note, Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 1547, 1613 (1994), comparing, Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early Closure" A View of the
Kaye Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. Cal. L Rev.
1115, 1129-31 (1993) (arguing that allegations against Kaye, Scholer based on this
theory were "nothing short of incredible"), with, Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Is-
sues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 8 (1993) (arguing
that this fiduciary duty of lawyers can be inferred from the banking statutes).
27. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 60; Scholz, Voluntary Compliance,
supra note 21, at 385.
28. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 60-63.
29. Overcompliance with depository institution safety and soundness regulations
can still result in increased savings to the insurance fund. An institution that avoids
even the level of high-risk loans allowed under applicable regulation is perhaps even
less likely to fail than an institution that is complying with the regulation, but doing
nothing more. Indeed, regulators may bully some institutions into excessively con-
servative lending practices, thereby transferring wealth from the institution's share-
holders to the insurance fund, in order to make up for regulatory laxity elsewhere.
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> reward > punishment > sucker. In a strategic form mode 30 of this
game, the firm's initial compliance options are arranged as rows and
the agency's enforcement options as columns, as shown in Figure 1.
The payoffs that each player receives are shown in the boxes corre-
sponding to the strategies the player has chosen. For example, the
box in the left hand column and top row shows that if the firm chooses
to comply and the agency chooses to cooperate, the firm has a payoff r
= -$2 million, the cost of compliance, and the agency has a payoff of R
= $100 million, the amount of expected savings to the insurance fund.
30. The strategic form model is comprised of "(1) a list of participants, or players,
(2) for each player, a list of strategies, and (3) for each array of strategies, one for each
player, a list of payoffs that the players receive." Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4,
at 10. A two player game is represented as a two dimensional table, with the players'
strategies arranged along either the top or the left side of the table. A three player
game is represented as a series of two dimensional tables, with each of the third
player's strategies corresponding to one of the tables. "Think of the three boxes as
being stacked one atop another like a multi-story parking-lot, and then [the third
player] chooses the level." Id. at 12.
A "second type of model of a game that is used in noncooperative game theory is
an extensive form game," id. at 13, which, unlike the strategic form game, shows the
order in which players choose the actions they will take. The extensive form game is
depicted with dots, called "nodes," each representing a position in the game at which
one of the players must choose an action. The first position is depicted by an open
dot and the remaining dots are filled in. A letter next to each node indicates which
player must choose an action at that position in the game. Each choice that is feasi-
ble for the choosing player is represented by an arrow, and each arrow points either
to another node, representing a new position in the game, or to an endpoint of the
game represented by a vector of numbers showing the payoffs of the players in order
(i.e., player A, then B, then C, or player 1, then 2, then 3). I, at 13-14. The game
shown in strategic form in Figure I would be depicted in extensive form as in example
(a) below if the firm moves first and as in example (b) if the agency moves first:
FIRM
CO:LY EVADE
-- AGENCY- -
COOPERATE DETERRENCE
(-2, 100) DETERRENCE COOPERATE (-3, 75)
(4,125) (-1,50)
Example (2)(a)
[Vol. 65
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AGENCY'S ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS
COOPERATE
(goal oriented)
DETERRENCE
(rule-oriented)
COMPLY
FIRM'S INITIAL
COMPLIANCE
OPTIONS
EVADE
FIGURE 1.3
1
In a single period game, both players would most likely choose the
defection strategy-deterrence for the agency; evasion for the firm-
knowing that such a strategy will maximize a player's payoff in that
round regardless of how the other player acts. Thus, unless there is
more than one round and a player can influence what the other player
will do in future rounds, no incentive to cooperate exists. Joint defec-
AGENCY
DETERRENCE
- - - FIRM - -
COMPLY EVADE
(-2, 100) (-1,50)
COMPLY EVADE
(-4,125) (-3,75)
Example (2)(b)
31. See Scholz, Voluntary Compliance, supra, note 21, at 389; Ayres & Braithwaite,
supra note 21, at 61. In game theory terminology, the defection strategy is said to
"dominate" the others. See Ayres & Braithwaite at 26-29 (discussing dominance argu-
ments as a solution technique in non-cooperative game theory). Player A will not
choose strategy x if, regardless of the strategy Player B chooses, strategy y gives
Player A a better payoff. In a single round game, row 2 in Figure 1 thus dominates
row 1 for the Firm and column 2 dominates column 1 for the Agency.
R = $l00 million T = S2 million
VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE
r = -$2 million s = -$4 million
S =$50 million P =S75 million
OPPORTUNISM LEGALISTICBATTLES
t = -$I million t = -S3 million
COOPERATE
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tion (row 2, column 2) thus would be the only Nash equilibrium 32 in a
single round game.
In a multi-round game, however, a player may estimate the ex-
pected present value of the player's accumulated payoffs from present
plus all future rounds. For example, the present value of all the firm's
payoffs V, given firm strategy f and agency strategy a would be:
Equation (1):
VXf,a) = Vft(f,,a/) + AVf,+1(f,+I,a,+) + "A2Vft+2(f,+2,a+2) + . 33
The present value of all the agency's payoffs Va, given firm strategy f
and agency strategy a would be:
Equation (2):
Va (fa) = V0,(f,,a,) + AV.t+(f,+i,ati) + A2V.t+2(ft, 2,at+2) +
if:
f, the firm's strategy in the tth period;
a, the agency's strategy in the tth period;
where 1, = cooperate and 2, = defect;
Vft(f,,a,) = the firm's payoff for the tth period; and
Va,(f,,at) = the agency's payoff for the tth period.34
The discount parameter A reflects the diminished value of a payoff
that is deferred for one round35 and every future payoff is multiplied
by this discount factor one time for each round that particular payoff
is deferred. For example, a payoff three rounds in the future is multi-
plied by a3 .
The game theoretic model defined by Scholz and used by Ayres and
Braithwaite has two easily identifiable Nash equilibria for multi-pe-
riod games between regulators and regulated firms:
(i) Joint cooperation
Regulators cooperate with firms and firms choose voluntary compli-
ance.36 This equilibrium is likely if conditions are ripe for mutual
trust between regulators and regulated firms, regulators and regu-
lated firms are repeat players who deal with each other on multiple
occasions, and if noncooperative conduct is easy to detect.
(ii) Joint defection
32. "A Nash equilibrium is an array of strategies, one for each player, such that no
player has an incentive (in terms of improving his own payoff) to deviate from his part
of the strategy array." Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 28. For discussion of
game-theory equilibria, see David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Sequential Equilibria,
50 Econometrica 863 (1982).
33. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 62.
34. Il
35. The discount parameter is inversely related to the discount rate r, often
thought of as the prevailing rate of interest, so that a = 11(1+r). Id. at 62.
36. A variety of strategies could be deployed to reach this equilibrium. Ayres and
Braithwaite focus on a tit-for-tat ("TFr") strategy, although a variety of other coop-
erative strategies could be deployed as well. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Regulators seek to deter firms and firms choose evasive strategies.
This equilibrium is particularly likely if regulators and regulated
firms do not trust one another, are not repeat players, or can engage
in noncooperative conduct that is difficult to detect.
The joint cooperation equilibrium is the Pareto optimal 7 equilibrium
because the agency can spend less on monitoring the firm and enforc-
ing its rules, and the firm can spend less on compliance and litigation
than if play devolved into a joint defection equilibrium. 38
Firm/agency games, however, can be far more complex than this
single version of the Scholz model might imply, as changes in payoffs39
can create different Nash equilibria. For example, given the right set
of payoffs, the following two strategies might constitute a Nash
equilibrium:
(i) Agency alternates between cooperative and non-cooperative ac-
tions, as long as Firm plays cooperatively at all times (and Firm does
not deviate from this pattern); Agency plays non-cooperatively for-
ever in the event of any deviation.
(ii) Firm plays cooperatively at all times, as long as Agency alter-
nates between cooperation and non-cooperation (and Firm does not
deviate from cooperation); Firm plays non-cooperatively forever
following any deviation from this strategy by the Agency.
Will Firm tolerate this result?' The answer depends on the payoffs.
If the payoffs are such that Firm will do better playing this strategy
than if it deviates, these strategies will constitute a Nash equilibrium.
37. "When the economy's resources and output are allocated in such a way that no
reallocation can make anyone better off without making at least one other person
worse off then a Pareto optimum is said to exist." The MIT Dictionary of Modem
Economics 320 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986). The joint cooperation equilibrium
is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient, however, if regulators can somehow force play into a
harassment equilibrium, which in Figure 1 maximizes total social wealth (S121 million,
or $125 million savings to the insurance fund less $4 million in compliance costs).
Kaldor-Hicks holds a move efficient if the winners gain more than the losers
lose, such that aggregate gain is possible if the losers are appropriately com-
pensated. This formulation is often used as a theoretic justification for gov-
ernment regulation, which invariably harms someone. The difficulty with
Kaldor-Hicks is that compensation from winner to loser is not required.
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309, 1372 n.197 (1995) (citation omitted).
38. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 60.
39. See id at 61.
40. These two strategies are discussed in Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 98-
99. "[If the game is asymmetric, then asymmetric equilibria do not seem so unreason-
able." Id. For example, the following game might very well lead to an asymmetric
equilibrium:
Agency
FUrm
cooperate non-cooperate
cooperate 5,6 -1,7
non-cooperate 6,-1 2,0
Example 3
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A different set of payoffs might allow the agency to play a non-coop-
erative strategy one third of the time so long as the Firm cooperates
all of the time; yet another might allow the Firm to play non-coopera-
tively three times out of four and cooperate one fourth of the time so
long as the Agency always plays cooperatively. The payoffs in the
boxes of the strategic form game determine whether a set of strategies
will be a Nash equilibrium. Each firm/agency game is different.
Can we predict how a firm/agency game will be played? Yes, if
there is a self-evident or obvious way to play.4' The Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium, however, is not necessarily the only Nash equilib-
rium and it is not necessarily a self-evident way to play. Indeed, for-
mal game theory may tell us very little about whether there is a self-
evident way to play, and if there is, what it might be. As David Kreps
points out:
[I]n some games with multiple equilibria, players still "know" what
to do. This knowledge comes from both directly relevant past expe-
rience and a sense of how individuals act generally. And formal
mathematical game theory has said little or nothing about where
these expectations come from, how and why they persist, or when
and why we might expect them to arise.42
Absent an obvious way to play, firms and agencies might settle into
any one of several Nash equilibria, or possibly even into a dise-
quilibrium, such as agency cooperate/firm defect or agency defect/finn
cooperate. The players might even elect to play randomized strate-
gies, with the agency or the firm randomly selecting periods in which
to defect or cooperate.43 The next part will explore whether lawyers
See id. at 98, Fig. 5.2(b). If the agency defects, the firm here is only slightly (one
point) worse off cooperating than not cooperating. Because the firm is much (6
points) better off with mutual cooperation than mutual defection, the firm is likely to
respond to a single round of agency defection by continuing to cooperate and hoping
for the best.
41. "If the game in question has or will come to have an evident way to play, then
a necessary condition for that evident way to play is that it is a Nash equilibrium."
Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 134. "[W]hen a particular game has no evident
way to play and we do not believe that one will be developed (say, via negotiation),
then there is no reason to study the set of equilibria." Id. at 135.
42. Id. at 101 (emphasis omitted). As Kreps points out, the best discussion of
these expectations remains the original treatment by Thomas Schelling, The Strategy
of Conflict (1960). David Kreps notes that "little to no progress has been made in
exploring Schelling's insights." Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 101.
43. Poker is perhaps the best example of randomized strategies as illustrated
below:
If you hold a bad hand, you will sometimes bet heavily on it and sometimes
not, choosing (in each instance) randomly between bluffing (betting) and
not. The idea is that you don't want your betting behavior to signal to your
opponents what cards you hold; you randomize between bluffing and not so
that when you bet heavily, your opponent is confused as to whether you hold
a good hand or not. Moreover, in an equilibrium you would choose between
bluffing or not with a bad hand just enough so that your opponent is indiffer-
ent between calling your bluff or giving in to it; if your opponent always calls
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help agencies and firms find and utilize a self-evident way to play that
brings them closer to the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
Nonetheless, a set of strategies exists that gives Pareto optimal
payoffs, although it is difficult to predict when players will choose to
play that way. Robert Axelrod's research suggests that for a large
enough discount parameter A, a tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy "can be an
equilibrium strategy for both players in a repeated period prisoner's
dilemma" and that, if played by both players, this strategy "engenders
the Pareto optimal jointly cooperative payoffs."" In a TFT strategy,
your bluff, then you would do better never to bluff, while if your opponent
always folds when you bid heavily, you would do better to bluff with higher
frequency, to win more hands with poor cards.
Id. at 103 n.6.
Interaction between a firm and a regulatory agency can be very much like a poker
game, and I have previously compared the role of the lawyer to that of a confidant
advising each of the players on how to play. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interde-
pendence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. Cal. L Rev. 507, 541-42
(1994). In this poker game:
[E]ach player hires a confidant who walks around the table peering into
other players' hands. Assume also that the confidant cannot tell the player
directly what cards other players have because the player's vocabulary does
not include the words heart, spade, club, or diamond, or words to describe
whole numbers. Only the most general communication such as "high,"
"low," and "face card" is possible. Finally, assume that none of the players
can see their own hand, which lies face down on the table, and that only the
confidant can look at it and explain the hand's strengths and weaknesses to
the player as best as possible in language that the player can understand.
Even if the players understand the rules of the game well enough to frame
their own objectives, they are most likely to win if they communicate their
objectives to their confidant and allow the confidant to decide which cards to
play.
Id
44. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 62. Axelrod structured a computer
tournament in which he invited professional game theorists to submit strategies that
would then be paired off against one another in prisoner's dilemma games of two
hundred moves each. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 30, app. A:
Tournament Results at 192-205 (1984). TFT won the tournament by achieving the
highest average score when played against the other strategies. Id. at 31. Gilson and
Mnookin draw on Axelrod's work to infer that "there may be circumstances under
which the parties can escape the prisoner's dilemma if there are significantly high
prospects that they will have a large number of future dealings with each other and
that they care enough about the outcomes of those future dealings." Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 22, at 521.
Although Axelrod's computer simulations show TFT to be the optimal strategy, his
observations of cooperation in real world settings reveal that a variety of strategies
are employed to achieve Pareto optimal jointly cooperative payoffs. One of the most
intriguing settings that Axelrod discusses is the "live and let live" system that evolved
during the trench warfare in World War I in which soldiers often restrained from
firing on the other side so long as their restraint was reciprocated. Axelrod, supra
note 4, at 21. When the British Battalions were rotated, the soldiers in the old battal-
ion would inform the incoming battalion of the optimal strategy for dealing with the
Germans: "'Mr. Bosche ain't a bad fellow, you leave 'ir alone; 'e'll leave you
alone."' Id at 81. "When defection actually occurred, [however], the retaliation was
often more than would be called for by TIT FOR TAT. Two-for-one or three-for-one
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"a prisoner's dilemma player cooperates until the opponent defects
and responds by defecting until the opponent cooperates. '45 Assum-
ing the discount factor is high enough, a player has an incentive to
cooperate because a temptation payoff today cannot make up for
lower punishment payoffs tomorrow. 46
Other recent research, however, indicates that a more forgiving
strategy than TFT may be advantageous in many circumstances, par-
ticularly if actors are "slow to cooperate or easy to offend" or if
"noise" occurs in the form of "mistakes, accidents, and mispercep-
tions. '47 Indeed, a TFT strategy may require a detailed record keep-
ing or "accounting" system and other monitoring costs which more
forgiving strategies may avoid.48 Such strategies include Tit For 2 Tats
(continue to cooperate until the other player defects twice in a row)
and Tit For 2 Tats Maximum (match the most generous of the other
player's two previous moves).49
Thus, although Scholz demonstrates the possibility of efficient firm/
agency cooperation, his model does not predict what strategies firms
and agencies actually will choose to play if they seek out a cooperative
strategy. Furthermore, empirical observation would probably reveal a
great many cases in which joint cooperation is not the equilibrium
reached in firm/agency games. This may result because either firms or
agencies are not solely interested in maximizing payoffs, or even if
they are, TFT or another cooperative strategy simply is not the self-
evident way to play.5" Some factors actually steer regulators and reg-
ulated firms away from strategies that engender the Pareto optimal
was a common response to an act that went beyond what was considered acceptable."
Id. at 80.
In like manner, the reaction of banking regulators to lawyers who defect from co-
operative play has sometimes been overreaction or even the type of massive retalia-
tion characteristic of a game defined by an inherently hostile environment. See infra
note 188 and accompanying text; Wilkins, supra note 6, at 837 (discussing the risk of
overdeterrence through institutional controls).
45. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 62.
46. 1& Axelrod specifically discusses Scholz's model of the iterated prisoner's di-
lemma game between firms and regulatory agencies. "The agency can adopt a strat-
egy such as TIT FOR TAT which would give the company an incentive to comply
voluntarily and thereby avoid the retaliation represented by the coercive enforcement
policy." Axelrod, supra note 44, at 156.
47. Peter Kollock, "An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind": Cooperation and
Accounting Systems, 58 Am. Soc. Rev. 768, 769 (1993).
48. See id. at 770. Circumstances exist, however, in which formulating contracts
among agencies, firms, and their lawyers can be advantageous. See infra notes 107-11
and accompanying text.
49. Kollock, supra note 47, at 774.
50. Less forgiving strategies than TFT predominated in the cooperative behavior
of opposing forces in World War I. See Axelrod, supra note 44 and accompanying
text. In other scenarios, there may not be any cooperative strategy that is self-evident
to the players.
[Vol. 65
1996] GAME THEORY & CONTRACTARIAN PARADIGMS 163
joint cooperation equilibrium. 51 Ayres and Braithwaite discuss two
such factors: (i) capture of regulators by regulated industry; and, (ii)
low discount parameters that cause either regulators or regulated in-
dustry to assign a low value to future payoffs from cooperation rela-
tive to present payoffs from opportunistic defection.
The first of these factors, regulatory capture,5 is discussed exten-
sively by Ayres and Braithwaite, who identify three different types of
capture: "1. [i]nefficient capture: where joint cooperation shifts to a
firm defect:agency cooperate equilibrium; 2. [z]ero-sum capture:
where joint defection shifts to a firm defect:agency cooperate equilib-
rium; [and] 3. [e]fficient capture: where joint defection shifts to a
joint cooperation equilibrium. '5 3 Inefficient capture and zero-sum
capture both increase the agency's sucker payoff above its punishment
51. I discuss two factors that shape equilibria, cultural norms and focal points,
more extensively in my discussion of firm lawyer-agency lawyer games. See infra notes
82-97 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 1.
53. Ayres and Braithwaite model the different types of capture in the following
diagram:
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATE DEFECT
U COOPERATE it, ST
U- zero sum
DEFECT T, S P, P
[where first letter represent firm's payoff
second letter represent agency's payoff]
R = reward payoff
S = sucker payoff
T = temptation payoff
P = punishment payoff
T>R>P>S 2R>S+T
Example 4
Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 69.
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payoff, so the "agency will not retaliate if the firm defects. '54 Ineffi-
cient capture results when, without capture, the agency and firm both
would have cooperated; it is wealth reducing because the agency and
the firm together receive lower payoffs than they would through joint
cooperation as the gain to the firm from a "temptation" payoff does
not make up for the loss to the agency from a "sucker" payoff. Zero-
sum capture results when, without capture, the agency and firm both
would have defected, but with capture the agency cooperates while
the firm defects. Zero-sum capture has "ambiguous welfare conse-
quences," but "unfair distributive effects" because it rewards firm de-
fection. 5 Efficient capture, on the other hand, reduces the agency's
temptation payoff and encourages cooperation that the agency might
otherwise forego in favor of defection. Efficient capture is wealth in-
creasing because it induces the agency to pursue a cooperative
strategy.56
Ayres and Braithwaite mention another factor steering regulators
and regulated firms toward a joint defection equilibrium, but they do
not emphasize this second factor in their analysis as much as regula-
tory capture; regulators and regulated industry alike may place a low
value on future payoffs from cooperation relative to present payoffs
from opportunistic defection. This disparity between the value of a
present versus future payoff is usually expressed as in Equation 157 by
multiplying the expected payoff in the nth period of play by a discount
parameter A-inversely related to the discount rate-raised to the nth
power. Even though this discounting equation is modeled on the time
value of money, factors other than the time value of money, such as
personal concerns of firm managers or political concerns of agency
administrators, can change discount parameters. Furthermore, play-
ers' perceptions of discount parameters, not actual discount parame-
ters, determine play in most games, and play can be steered away
from cooperation toward joint defection when decisionmakers who
choose strategies for agencies or for firms think in terms of short time
horizons.
For example, a cynic might suggest that political superiors supervis-
ing regulatory agencies see the discount parameter A in period n as
being close to zero if period n is beyond the date of the next election.
54. Il at 63. The capture formula used by Ayres and Braithwaite for a single-
period payoff is:
V'of,,a,) = a Vf,(f,,a,) + (1 - a) V,,(ffa,)
where 1 _< a _ 0. The variable a is a measurement of capture, and the other parame-
ters are those defined in Equation 1 supra. "When a = 0, the agency's payoff is simply
the same as in the original enforcement game (in which the agency was implicitly
trying to maximize social welfare). When a = 1, however, capture is complete in that
the agency payoff is identical to the regulated firm's payoff. For intermediate values
of a, the agency's payoff is a weighted average of the public and private concerns." Id.
55. Id. at 65, 69.
56. Itt
57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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At a minimum, agency administrators and their political superiors
may view a one-shot temptation payoff from harassing a regulated
firm at the right time as being far more valuable than a greater reward
payoff from cooperation spread out over a longer period of time. If
the political superiors want a temptation payoff now, and if there is
little or no efficient capture to discourage agency defection,5" agency
administrators may be pressured from above to pursue a harassment
strategy regardless of future consequences. Regulated firms, antici-
pating that regulators will defect to maximize short term payoffs, will
likely defect as well. For example, an administration that has prom-
ised to crack down on depository institutions may assign a low dis-
count parameter to future payoffs from joint cooperation and instead
favor a one-shot harassment payoff in an election year. Depository
institutions, knowing the administration's promises to the electorate
and anticipating when regulators will implement their defection strat-
egy, will avoid the sucker payoff by defecting as well. 59
On the industry side, corporate managers may also think in terms of
shorter time horizons, and thus assign artificially low discount param-
eters to future payoffs from joint cooperation with regulators. Such is
likely to be the case if: (i) management compensation is tied to short
term earnings, (ii) the firm experiences a cash flow problem that could
threaten management's tenure, or (iii) managers are reaching the end
of their tenure and a substantial portion of the reward payoff from
joint cooperation will occur on subsequent managers' watch.' This
agency problem is a classic feature in the literature on corporate gov-
ernance,6 1 and is no less prominent in game theoretic equilibria
58. Tuning of elections and other key political events not only may affect discount
parameters and thus maximize the value of short-term payoffs, but also may affect
regulatory capture. An executive branch that is dependant on regulated industry for
campaign contributions or other support may have a higher capture coefficient a and
therefore a higher sucker payoff and a lower temptation payoff.
59. Although mutual defection will cause both players to receive a "punishment
payoff," the political climate may be such that what is "punishment" to the agency is
"reward" for political superiors in charge of the agency who relish political opportuni-
ties that come from legalistic battles.
60. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 78-79. Ayres and Braithwaite discuss a
possible distinction between senior managers, who must play ball with regulators, and
middle managers, who tend to have shorter time horizons and thus tend to be less
cooperative. Id. As discussed in part II.B below, lawyers, and particularly in-house
lawyers, can bridge this gap by communicating the cooperative strategies of senior
managers to middle management. See infra part U.B.
61. In corporations, the separation of ownership from control may cause managers
to not always act in the best interest of shareholders. See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner
C. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 7 (1932). The system of
corporate governance described by Berle and Means may not be as predominant in a
market controlled by institutional investors. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passiv-
ity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 522-25 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors,
43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 863 (1991). Institutional investors, however, may not want to
participate in corporate governance. See John C. Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control
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shaped by strategies that are for the most part chosen by a firm's man-
agers rather than by its shareholders. Managers with short time hori-
zons are thus more likely to assign a low discount parameter to future
reward payoffs from cooperation and in turn are more likely to opt
instead for defection. After suspecting this to be the case, regulators
will effectively steer play toward joint defection, to avoid getting the
sucker payoff.
B. The New Players-Regulatory Lawyers
This Article uses a model in which these games between firms and
agencies in the Scholz model co-exist with similar games between law-
yers representing agencies and lawyers representing firms. These
multi-round lawyer-lawyer games extend over a period of time and
cut across both individual client representations by firm lawyers and
regulatory cases handled by agency lawyers. Because lawyers play
their games at the same time as they advise clients on how to play the
underlying firm/agency games, lawyer strategies influence client strat-
egies and vice-versa.62
As with the agency/firm games described in section A, the game
theoretic model could identify many Nash equilibria for lawyer-lawyer
games. TWo will be discussed further here:
(i) Joint cooperation
Agency lawyers cooperate with firm lawyers, do not instigate har-
assment of firms and discourage their political superiors from such
harassment. Firm lawyers actively discourage defection by their cli-
ents, perhaps by resigning or even blowing the whistle when a client
defects.
(ii) Joint defection
Agency lawyers encourage harassment of firms. Firm lawyers en-
courage and do not disclose firm defection and may actively facili-
tate firm defection.
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1287 (1991)
(stating that institutional investors prefer liquidity over control); Roberta Romano,
Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 795, 798-99 (1993).
62. Firm lawyer/agency lawyer games could be modelled as prisoner's dilemmas
similar to the firm/agency strategic form game in Figure 1 or the firm/agency extensive
form game in supra note 30, with each lawyer having a choice between "cooperation"
and "defection." Two-by-two normal form games such as the prisoner's dilemma,
chicken, and the battle of the sexes, have their limitations, however. Indeed, "[a]
problem that may look like a prisoner's dilemma or some other simple two-by-two
game may be part of a much larger game. One cannot assume that, once embedded in
a larger game, the play of the smaller game will be the same." Baird, supra note 4, at
45. Introducing lawyers into a firm/agency game is a good illustration of this point;
firm/agency games and firm lawyer/agency lawyer games are embedded in each other
in a way that may fundamentally change play in both. Furthermore, although this
Article uses the prisoner's dilemma to model firm lawyer/agency lawyer interaction
and to illustrate the utility of game theory for understanding such interaction, other
games could be equally informative.
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The joint cooperation equilibrium is more probable if. (i) firm law-
yers and agency lawyers are repeat players who deal with each other
on multiple occasions, (ii) noncooperative conduct by either is easy to
detect, and (iii) information about lawyers' reputations is readily
available. The joint defection equilibrium may evolve if: (i) firm law-
yers or agency lawyers are not repeat players, (ii) noncooperative con-
duct by lawyers is difficult to detect, or (ii) information about
lawyers' reputations is not readily available. Joint defection thus is
particularly likely if lawyers who are unlikely to defect cannot success-
fully distinguish themselves from other lawyers. Furthermore, agency
lawyers are very likely to defect in their play with firm lawyers who
have a reputation for noncooperative strategies. Not only are these
lawyers likely to defect frequently, but regulated firms which intend to
defect are likely to hire these lawyers.
For individual lawyers, the payoffs from these different equilibria-
the amount in each of the boxes in their own strategic form games-
will vary with the nature of their practice and the type of clients they
represent. When lawyers represent clients who themselves seek to
stabilize a joint cooperation equilibrium with agencies, the lawyers
will want to help ease regulatory burdens for their clients and thus
may themselves realize high payoffs from their own cooperation with
agency lawyers. When lawyers represent clients whose play with
agencies has or will devolve to a joint defection equilibrium, however,
the lawyers will not realize high payoffs from cooperating with agency
lawyers. Indeed, such cooperation will irritate clients and could even
cause the lawyers to be discharged.
Because lawyers play their own games cutting across client repre-
sentations at the same time as they participate in formulation of client
strategies, firm lawyer/agency lawyer games influence the outcome of
the underlying firm/agency games. First, both firm and agency lawyers
can influence whether regulatory capture occurs, and if it does,
whether efficient, inefficient, or zero-sum capture is the most likely
outcome. Second, even if a regulated firm is not a repeat player,
which makes a joint defection equilibrium between agency and firm
particularly likely, the firm's lawyers almost always are repeat players.
A joint cooperation equilibrium may thus evolve between firm law-
yers and agency lawyers and spill over into the game between the firm
and the agency. If the regulated firm is a repeat player in the regula-
tory game with the agency, introduction of lawyers into the game
could strengthen the stability of a joint cooperation equilibrium that
already has evolved or cause a joint defection equilibrium to tilt to-
ward joint cooperation. Using their extensive experience playing reg-
ulatory games, lawyers might help agencies and firms find the self-
evident way to play63 that brings them closer to a Pareto optimal equi-
63. See Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 134-35.
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librium. Third, lawyers can play a more ominous role in both their
own and their clients' games, particularly if they assume a more litig-
ious disposition, causing joint cooperation equilibria to tilt toward
joint defection. As will be discussed further in part II.C. below, rules
of professional responsibility, as well as social and cultural norms
within the legal profession, influence the equilibria that evolve once
firm lawyer/agency lawyer games are superimposed on firm/agency
games.
1. Lawyer Play Influencing Agency Play-The Capture Paradigm
Lawyers working in regulatory agencies usually have a lower sus-
ceptibility to inefficient and zero-sum captures4 than their political
superiors. First, these lawyers do not benefit, at least not directly,
from the lobbying and campaign contributions that capture their polit-
ical superiors. Furthermore, agency lawyers, like other lawyers, invest
substantial human capital in building a reputation for thoroughness,
integrity, and zealous representation of their clients. This reputational
paradigm is reinforced by values of the legal profession that accord
the most respect to the toughest government lawyers, and not to the
weakest or most accommodating. One of the best examples is former
United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani, whose aggressive and often
criticized tactics against insider traders and other white collar
criminals earned him the enmity of Wall Street, but who had no
trouble landing a high paying job with a New York firm prior to his
election as Mayor of the City of New York.65 Similarly, Gary Lynch,
one of the most aggressive enforcement division chiefs at the SEC in
recent memory, is now a much sought after partner of Davis Polk &
Wardwell. 66 Former OTS Chief Counsel Harris Weinstein, once de-
rided by bar associations for his 1992 attachment of a law firm's assets
in an enforcement proceeding, has returned to a successful practice at
Covington & Burling.67 By contrast, a reputation for being a "push
64. Susceptibility to capture is reflected in the capture quotient a. For the capture
formula, see supra note 54.
65. Giuliani first earned a reputation as a tough lawyer while working at the Jus-
tice Department in the early 1980s. In 1983, Giuliani returned to New York as a
United States Attorney. In 1992, Giuliani joined Anderson Kill Olick & Oshinsky,
with a salary of $350,000 a year. See Michael Powell, Knows How He's Doin', News-
day, Jan. 3, 1994, at 3, 10A.
66. See Linda Himelstein, Gary Lynch-'Just The Facts Ma'am', Bus. Wk., Aug. 8,
1994, at 60-61. Gary Lynch worked for the SEC for 13 years and was the enforcement
chief during his last four years at the SEC. Id. at 61. Lynch earned his reputation by
bringing charges against Ivan F. Boesky and Michael R. Milken. Id. at 60. In 1989,
Lynch resigned from the SEC and accepted a lucrative job as a partner at Davis Polk
& Wardwell, where he has represented Kidder, Peabody & Co. in connection with a
government securities trading scandal and Nomura in connection with alleged securi-
ties laws violations. Id. at 60-61.
67. Today's News: Update, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Today's
News]; Weinstein Resigns From OTS; Plans To Depart By December 26, Office of
Thrift Supervision News Release, Dec. 14, 1992 [hereinafter Weinstein Resigns] (on
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over" while working for an agency may curry short-term favor with
the private sector, but is unlikely to enhance a lawyer's professional
reputation with those who remember him as a less than formidable
opponent.
Standards of professional conduct also accord a high value to client
loyalty and zealous representation, and emphasize the obligation of a
government lawyer to protect the public interest and not simply act
out of political expediency.6" Finally, the fact that most high-ranking
lawyers at regulatory agencies could earn more in the private sector
makes them less worried about losing their jobs and perhaps less
likely to succumb to pressures from "captured" political superiors.
None of these factors will entirely isolate agency lawyers from cap-
ture, but each helps make agency lawyers less prone to capture than
their political superiors. In many instances, an agency that is domi-
nated by a highly respected staff of lawyers will be less likely than an
agency dominated by political appointees to play a cooperative strat-
egy against a regulated firm that has chosen to defect.
At the same time, agency lawyers are prone to efficient capture.69
They may be less inclined than their political superiors to be overzeal-
ous in their enforcement efforts or to choose a strategy of harassment
against a firm that has chosen to cooperate. The political rewards for
harassment are not as likely to benefit lawyers, except to the extent
that such rewards are passed on from political superiors in the form of
raises, promotions, and the like. Indeed, the lawyers may someday
hope to work for the firms that are the objects of such harassment.
Competence and zealous representation of the public interest are one
thing, but giving a firm that has chosen to cooperate the sucker payoff
is quite another. Although some agency lawyers will do anything to
file with the Fordham Law Review). Harris Weinstein was an associate at Covington
& Burling from 1962 to 1967, and from 1967 to 1969 served as an assistant to the
Solicitor General of the United States. See Weinstein Resigns, supra. In 1969, he re-
turned to Covington & Burling, was made a partner in 1971, and remained there until
1990 when he became Chief Counsel at the OTS. Id. In 1992, Weinstein returned to
Covington & Burling. Today's News, supra, at 1. For a discussion of enforcement
proceedings brought by Weinstein on behalf of the OTS against lawyers and other
professionals, see infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text; see also Scott J. Paltrow,
The Revolving Door, L.A. Tunes, Mar. 13, 1994, at D1 (discussing private sector jobs
landed by several top government enforcement officials, including former SEC Chair-
man David Ruder at Baker & McKenzie).
68. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the
Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. Cal. L Rev. 951,
955 (1991). Canon 7 describes the duty of loyalty as one of "zealous representation,"
yet government attorneys, perhaps even more than other lawyers, should "temper
their advocacy in the interests of 'justice."' Id. at 955 & n.124 see Model Code of
Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1995) [hereinafter Model Code].
69. For a discussion of the modelling of efficient capture, see supra note 53 and
accompanying text. Efficient capture, by reducing the value of the temptation payoff
to the agency, can cause a joint-defection equilibrium to shift toward a joint-coopera-
tion equilibrium.
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curry favor with their political superiors, the reputational paradigm
will distinguish between an agency lawyer known to be a "tough oppo-
nent" and one widely regarded, in more colloquial language, to be a
"jerk." An agency lawyer, perhaps more than her political superiors,
also is likely to recognize a good argument for regulatory flexibility
and to recognize when the firm making that argument is itself playing
a cooperative strategy. The negotiation skills and astuteness of agency
lawyers thus can have a significant role in promoting an objective that
Ayres and Braithwaite seek to accomplish through other means: 0 "a
socialization of regulators that renders them more open to lobbying
that promotes efficient capture, more resistant to lobbying that pro-
motes zero-sum, and inefficient capture."'" This ideal of "regulatory
reasonableness, ' or the middle ground between agency capture and
agency opportunism, is more likely to be realized when lawyers have a
significant role in choosing an agency's strategies than when they do
not.
2. Lawyer Play Influencing Firm Play
Lawyers are likely to exert a stabilizing influence on firm strategies
as well. Lawyers benefit much less, and can be hurt much more than
their clients, by firm opportunism that leaves a regulatory agency with
the sucker payoff. The lawyers probably will deal with the same
agency in the future not only on behalf of that client, but also on be-
half of other clients. If the agency blames a client's defection on the
lawyer, or believes that the lawyer could have done something to pre-
vent it, other clients may have difficulty achieving an equilibrium of
joint cooperation with the agency when represented by the same law-
yer. For example, a federal communications lawyer who has made
enemies at the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is not a
particularly good choice for a communications firm seeking coopera-
tion with the FCC.73 If the majority of a lawyer's clients seek cooper-
ative play with the FCC, the lawyer thus will probably choose to
cooperate consistently with the agency. Other clients will probably
have to conform to this cooperative strategy or look elsewhere for
counsel.
70. Ayres and Braithwaite focus on reducing inefficient and zero-sum capture and
encouraging efficient capture through industry-agency dialogue and public interest
group participation in the regulatory process. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21,
at 71-75.
71. Id at 70.
72. Id. at 68.
73. See Emerson, supra note 19, at 243-44. The FCC clearly relies on informal
sanctions. "Communications lawyers, usually getting what they seek, generally need
to remain chummy with the FCC rather than fight it .... The broadcast attorney
seeks to show everything about his client that is wholesome and to the community's
benefit while pointing out the opposite in any opponent." Il (footnotes omitted). As
of 1991, the FCC had only had two lawyer disciplinary hearings since its inception in
1934. Id. at 238.
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Lawyers representing regulated firms also have skills in communi-
cating with regulators that firm managers may lack. Their sophisti-
cated understanding of the subject matter at stake and of the agency's
policy objectives can be critical to the negotiation between players
that facilitates cooperative play.74 Indeed, one of the most valuable
services that firm lawyers may provide, particularly if they have previ-
ous experience representing regulatory agencies, is guidance toward
that elusive self evident way to play that brings clients closer to a
Pareto optimal equilibrium.75
Lawyers on both sides of the regulatory game thus have the poten-
tial to assist the players in establishing and stabilizing an equilibrium
of joint cooperation. In single-round games between agencies and
firms, joint defection is almost certain unless firm lawyers can induce
firm cooperation in order to increase the value of future rounds that
the lawyers will play with the same agencies on behalf of other clients.
In multi-round games between agencies and firms, agency and firm
lawyers are particularly likely to facilitate negotiation toward cooper-
ative equilibrium and to discourage opportunism. Because leaving the
other player with the sucker payoff usually benefits lawyers far less
than such a strategy benefits firm managers and agency political
superiors, each side is likely to fear the other's opportunism less when
lawyers have a significant role in choosing and implementing strate-
gies. Once firms and agencies decide on cooperation, lawyers can
help them find self-evident ways to play that sustain cooperation and
benefit everyone.
3. Agency Lawyer and Firm Lawyer Defection
So much for the good news that lawyers have a powerful potential
to induce firms and regulators to choose the Nash equilibrium of joint
cooperation. As David Kreps observes, however, "Unless a given
game has a self-evident way to play, self-evident to the participants,
the notion of a Nash equilibrium has no particular claim upon our
attention."76 Furthermore, if a game has more than one Nash equilib-
rium, it can be very difficult to predict which one the players will
choose.77 Simply because one equilibrium maximizes each player's
wealth, does not mean that players will choose it-indeed, the equilib-
rium that most game theorists would predict in a prisoners' dilemma
game with only a few rounds would be joint defection,' 8 not joint co-
74. "[T]he conditions for Nash equilibrium are that players are relatively certain
how their opponents will act." Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 140. Players vill
see that a particular mode of behavior will be followed by other players if the players
"have the opportunity to negotiate before play of the 'game."' Id.
75. Id at 134-35.
76. Id. at 31.
77. Id.
78. "[E]ach will probably choose the 'non-cooperative action,' since there is no
way to bind the other party or for the other party to inflict on the first some form of
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operation. Joint cooperation and joint defection are also only two of
the many possible Nash equilibria in lawyer/lawyer as well as firm!
agency games-and joint cooperation is by no means the self-evident
way to play. Lawyers are not always more inclined than their clients
to choose cooperation; while some lawyers choose cooperative strate-
gies in their own play with regulators and encourage their clients to do
the same, others exacerbate the distrust between agencies and firms
which inevitably leads to joint defection.
Some agency lawyers simply do not want to play cooperatively,
even if firm lawyers are playing cooperatively. Agency lawyers could
be overworked and not have time to distinguish between cooperation
and defection on the part of firm lawyers. Alternatively, agencies may
delegate too much discretion to less experienced lawyers who cannot
recognize when firm lawyers are cooperating and who overcompen-
sate for inexperience by assuming the worst from both firms and firm
lawyers. Finally, agency lawyers may be constrained by inflexible pro-
cedures that do not allow them to reciprocate cooperative play by firm
lawyers. For example, rules may require that bank examinations be
carried out frequently, in a relatively burdensome manner, with little
room to adjust the level of scrutiny or make exceptions to rules, re-
gardless of the bank involved or the lawyers the bank has chosen to
represent it.
On the firm lawyer side, some lawyers facilitate the most extreme
form of firm defection-outright illegal conduct-perhaps the worst
example being lawyers who make misrepresentations to federal regu-
lators on behalf of savings and loans.79 In addition, bar associations
sometimes interpret rules of professional conduct to justify and even
require lawyer defection from cooperative play with regulators when
clients engage in improper conduct.8 0 Such defection may improve a
punishment." Id. at 29. Theoretically at least, a prisoner's dilemma game with a
known, finite number of rounds, will devolve into mutual defection. Id. at 70.
79. John H. Cushman, Jr., Paul, Weiss Law Firm to Pay U.S. $45 Million, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1993, at Dl. Aggressive enforcement actions were brought by the
OTS and Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") in the wake of the savings and loan
debacle of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most of these actions alleged that attorneys
who represented failed institutions facilitated their clients' efforts to mislead federal
regulators. Almost all of these actions against law firms were settled prior to trial,
and settlements totaled over $200 million. These include settlements against Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue ($50 million), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison ($45
million), Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, in a case which is discussed more
extensively in the section that follows ($41 million), and Troutman, Sanders, Lock-
erman & Ashmore ($20 million). Id. Settlements by accounting firms included Ernst
& Young ($128 million) and Arthur Andersen ($65 million). Id. The Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), enacted after
much of the conduct in these actions was alleged to have occurred, now expressly
includes attorneys within its definition of "institution-affiliated part[ies]" subject to
OTS enforcement remedies. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (1994).
80. See Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regulated Clients, ABA,
Report to the House of Delegates (1993) (concerning the Kaye, Scholer matter and
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client's payoffs in a single round of play, but leads regulators to antici-
pate future defection not only by those particular lawyers, but by law-
yers in general. Regulators in turn are tempted to believe that lawyer
defection will follow client defection because lawyers believe such de-
fection to be not only an acceptable strategy, but an obligation. Ab-
sent a yardstick for determining which lawyers will defect in these
circumstances, and which will not and instead resign or blow the whis-
tle, agency lawyers will avoid the sucker payoff by choosing strategies
that reflect their trust in the regulated client, not its lawyer.
Furthermore, even if lawyers will not acquiesce in the type of ex-
treme client defection that involves clear violation of law, agency
problems may encourage lawyers to steer their clients away from a
cooperative strategy. The punishment payoff in games between firms
and agencies, described as "Legalistic Battles" in Figure 1, often trans-
lates into more billable hours for firm lawyers. Consequently, it may
not matter that the lawyers participating in or instigating these legalis-
tic battles are themselves receiving the punishment payoff in play with
agency lawyers. The lawyers may fear that the alternative, firm/
agency cooperation, wiU deny lawyers opportunities to play at all.
Some lawyers may also value the opportunity to score a highly visi-
ble victory against regulators and enhance their own reputational cap-
ital, even if the aggregate payoff for their client from such a strategy is
lower than the payoff from joint cooperation. Alternatively, some
lawyers may not be wealth maximizers; they may enjoy conflict for its
own sake and act accordingly. As David Kreps observes, "Money is
not everything to every player, and models of competitive situations,
if they are to be useful models of reality (i.e., predict behavior, in real
contexts) must take this into account as best they can.""1 Lawyers,
perhaps more than other players, may derive satisfaction from joust-
ing with regulators, even though winning an argument with a regulator
over a technical point or obstructing an investigation can be a Pyrrhic
victory for clients who risk getting the punishment payoff in future
rounds.
others like it). The Working Group complains that, among the OTS's "novel theories
of professional responsibility" is the notion that lawyers have an obligation to report
misconduct to superiors, going "all the way to the client's board of directors." Id. at 6-
7. Regulators, according to the Working Group, are also wrong to "seek to impose a
duty of due diligence on lawyers with respect to the accuracy of any statements made
to federal banking agencies by the lawyers." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Finally, "the
regulators have sometimes taken the view that the lawyer must resign if his or her
efforts to prevent the wrongdoing prove unsuccessful. The Working Group again be-
lieves this to be an incorrect reading of [Model] Rule 1.13 and [Model] Rule 1.16." Id.
The Working Group takes this position despite the fact that the ABA's own ethics
opinions require a lawyer to withdraw when her services will further a client's fraud.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992)
(advocating withdrawal when a lawyer's services will otherwise be used to perpetrate
a fraud).
81. Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 120.
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C. How Convention, Rules, and Professional Ideology Shape
Equilibria in Lawyer Games
The discussion in part I.B illustrates how play between firm lawyers
and agency lawyers, like firms and agencies, can gravitate toward an
equilibrium of joint cooperation or an equilibrium of joint defection.
In some circumstances, lawyers' reputations alone give them a power-
ful incentive to cooperate. In other circumstances, however, reputa-
tional incentives will not deter defection, and legal rules or other
external incentives for cooperative conduct can help steer firm law-
yers and agency lawyers toward a cooperative equilibrium. In still
other circumstances, legal rules or other external influences may steer
lawyers toward an equilibrium of mutual defection.
Rules of professional responsibility are an important source of focal
points' in firm lawyer/agency lawyer games. Some mandatory rules
steer lawyers toward mutual cooperation by prohibiting or circum-
scribing both (i) firm lawyer conduct that facilitates a client's defec-
tion from cooperative play with an agency and (ii) firm lawyer
conduct that is itself defection from cooperative play with agency law-
yers. Such rules prohibit a lawyer from assisting a client in a crime or
fraud,83 prohibit a lawyer from misrepresenting law or facts to a judi-
cial or administrative tribunal,' require a lawyer to disclose a client's
82. Moral codes can motivate players to adhere to a specific path of conduct, or
"focal-point." See Christina Bicchieri, Norms of Cooperation, 100 Ethics 838, 848
(1990); Philip Petit, Virtus Normativa. Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 Ethics 725,
733 (1990). A focal point, also referred to as a Schelling Point, is "the combination of
strategies that players are likely to choose because it is especially prominent under the
conditions and culture in which the players find themselves." Baird, supra note 4, at
307. For the origin of this phrase, see Thomas C. ScheUing, The Strategy of Conflict
(1960).
83. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) (1995) [hereinafter
Model Rules]; Model Code, supra note 68, DR 7-102(A)(7).
84. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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perjury, 85 and require a lawyer to resign from representing a client
under certain circumstances.
Other rules facilitate detection and punishment of lawyer defection.
These rules usually require a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowl-
edge of an ethical violation by another lawyer to report such knowl-
edge to a tribunal or authority empowered to investigate the
situation.8 7 This reporting requirement helps counteract the "norm"'a
of silence that can steer firm lawyer/agency lawyer games to a defect/
defect equilibrium, or even to a defect/cooperate equilibrium s9 if
85. Both the Model Code and the Model Rules clearly prohibit a lawyer from
knowingly presenting false testimony or false evidence at a trial or an administrative
proceeding. Under Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1), however, a lawyer's duty to reveal
past perjury is apparently subordinate to the lawyer's duty not to reveal privileged
communications. See Model Code, supra note 68, DR 7-102(B)(1); see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (interpret-
ing the words "privileged communication" in DR 7-102(B)(1) to include both "coafi-
dences," meaning information communicated to the lawyer by the client, and
"secrets," meaning any other information learned in the course of the professional
relationship). Model Rule 3.3 reversed this position. According to ABA Formal
Opinion 87-353:
It is now mandatory, under these Model Rule provisions, for a lawyer, who
knows the client has committed perjury, to disclose this knowledge to the
tribunal if the lawyer cannot persuade the client to rectify the perjury ... the
obligation of a lawyer to disclose to the tribunal client perjury committed
during the proceeding, which the lawyer learns about prior to the conclusion
of the proceeding, represents a reversal of prior opinions of this Committee
given under earlier rules of professional conduct.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987).
More recently, ABA Formal Opinion 376 addressed situations where a client lies in
response to discovery requests. The ABA recommends the same course of action it
would at trial: attempted persuasion and withdrawal, and if these approaches fail,
disclosure to opposing counsel or to the court. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 376 (1993). Also, Model Rule 3.9 provides that a
lawyer shall conform to Rule 3.3 when representing a client in a legislative or adminis-
trative proceeding. See Model Rules, supra note 83, Rule 3.9.
86. See Model Rules, supra note 83, Rule 1.16; Model Code, supra note 68, DR 2-
110(B). Model Rule 1.16(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client, and
shall withdraw from a representation that has commenced if the representation will
violate rules of professional conduct. Perhaps the best example of such a violation is
when the representation would conflict with a concurrent or previous representation
of another person by the same lawyer. Model Code DR 2-110(B) also explicitly states
that withdrawal is required where the lawyer knows that her client is bringing an
action or asserting a defense "merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously in-juring any person." Model Code, supra note 68, DR 2-110(B).
87. See Model Code, supra note 68, DR 1-103(a); Model Rules, supra note 83,
Rule 8.3(a); In re Himmel, 533 N.E2d 790, 791, 796 (Ill. 1988) (suspending a lawyer
from practice for one year for violating DR 1-103(a)).
88. For a discussion of ideological norms of the profession, see infra notes 96-98
and accompanying text.
89. For example, an inexperienced agency lawyer might be intimidated by a more
experienced firm lawyer and not know how to retaliate, yet not want to report the
firm lawyer's misconduct. Also, even if a lawyer working for an agency can retaliate
for a firm lawyer's defection by increasing regulatory scrutiny of the lawyer's clients,
such retaliation might expose the agency lawyer to charges of harassment. See Susan
Beck, Keating's Bouncer, Am. Law., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 40, 45 (describing how Kaye,
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there is little confidence that lawyers who defect while others cooper-
ate will be reported and punished ex post.90 Although the reporting
requirement may thus restore confidence that lawyer defection will be
detected and punished, this requirement could also have the opposite
effect of fostering distrust among lawyers. Such distrust is particularly
likely if the reporting requirement provides apparent justification for
lawyers who file malicious or unfounded disciplinary reports either
out of spite or to achieve tactical advantage in litigation."
Furthermore, although some rules of professional conduct facilitate
cooperative play, other rules have the opposite effect because they
make it difficult for one lawyer to determine if another lawyer has
defected. For example, rules prohibiting a lawyer from disclosing cli-
ent misconduct may help conceal lawyer complicity in that conduct,
even though such complicity violates other rules of professional re-
sponsibility.92 Lawyer defection from cooperative play thus is difficult
to detect in circumstances where the lawyer may not disclose the de-
Scholer repeatedly threatened the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") with
lawsuits in order to deflect a regulatory crackdown on Lincoln Savings and Loan).
90. Of course, an agency lawyer may have at her disposal the means to punish a
defecting firm lawyer without reporting that lawyer's conduct to the appropriate au-
thorities. If so, reporting may not be needed as a deterrent.
91. Bad faith reporting is a serious problem in the profession:
It bears emphasis that this right to report misconduct, though generally serv-
ing the salutary purpose of assisting courts, disciplinary agencies and other
authorities in policing members of the bar, is unquestionably susceptible to
abuse by attorneys seeking to gain advantages or concessions from other
lawyers in the course of litigation, in private business transactions, or in in-
terpersonal relationships, or by attorneys acting purely out of spite.
N.Y. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 635 (1992). As pointed out by Pro-
fessor Geoffrey Hazard:
Another development raising questions about the mandatory reporting rule
emerging in several jurisdictions is the practice of filing a disciplinary charge
whenever a dispute between lawyers gets heated. The result has been a
surge of petty disciplinary matters. These grievances are ostensibly justified
but often are motivated by anger or vengefulness. They add a burden to
overloaded disciplinary systems and corrode already fragile relations within
the bar.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, "Squeal Rule" Considered for Change, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 26, 1990,
at 13, 14. One factor that may help reduce the number of bad faith disciplinary com-
plaints was the ABA's interpretation of Model Rule 8.3, requiring that reporting be
prompt and without delay. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 383 (1994) (stating that "[a] lawyer who becomes aware of profes-
sional misconduct that raises a substantial question as to a lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects should report that misconduct
romptly, to the extent required by Rule 8.3(a), and not use it as a bargaining chip in
] civil case").
92. Model Rule 1.6 permits disclosure of confidential client information only to
prevent commission of a crime likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. If
the client only intends to commit fraud or crimes causing financial injury, disclosure is
not permitted. In some situations, a lawyer may be compelled to withdraw from rep-
resenting a client because Model Rule 1.2(d) states that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent." Model Rules, supra note 83, Rule 1.2(d).
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fection of his client in the underlying game. Not only is the defection
of both lawyer and client more likely to go undetected, but, even if the
lawyer's defection is discovered, the lawyer can argue that his own
options were limited by prohibitions on disclosure of client
confidences.
Even non-binding rules of professional responsibility can be signifi-
cant. An important difference between game theory and the con-
tractarian theory discussed later in this Article 93 is that in game theory
a rule need not be binding in order to influence interaction between
two or more persons. Thus, a rule which is not enforced through disci-
plinary measures, for example an Ethical Consideration in the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, can become a focal point and
change the way lawyers behave.94
Another important source of focal points is ideological norms in the
profession, whether or not these norms are incorporated into rules of
professional conduct.95 For example, lawyers may generally believe
that loyalty to clients is more important than playing cooperatively
with one another.96 If so, it may not make much difference that a firm
The predecessor to the Model Rules, the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, is somewhat more flexible, allowing disclosure when a client intends to
commit a crime. "A lawyer may reveal ... (3) [t]he intention of his client to commit
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." Model Code, supra note
68, DR 4-101(C) (emphasis added). The Model Code does not, however, allow disclo-
sure when the intended conduct is an intentional tort, a civil fraud, or any other act
which does not amount to a crime. See Model Code, supra note 68, DR 4-101. The
Model Code, like the Model Rules, is permissive; under no circumstances is a lawyer
required to disclose. Finally, the Model Code, like the Model Rules, does not allow
disclosure in order to rectify results of past crimes. Although DR 7-102(A)(7) states
that "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:... (7) [clounsel or assist his
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent," the Code does not
require a lawyer who has already done so to reveal the client's crime or fraud.
93. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
94. I will argue in another paper that, for this reason, the drafters of the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility erred in not retaining the Ethical Considerations
of the Model Code. See Richard W. Painter, Contractarianism and Game Theory in
Professional Responsibility: Should Lawyers and Clients Play By Immutable or De-
fault Rules? (unpublished manuscript).
95. David Kreps, in his analysis of game theory, discusses several factors that can
create strategic uncertainties and steer players toward a certain mode of play, whether
or not that mode of play is optimal One of these factors is social convention. Kreps
gives the example of a Korean student and a Korean professor bargaining over poker
chips; a game which the Korean professor presumably almost always will win. See
Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 142-43.
96. As Lord Brougham stated in the Trial of Queen Caroline:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go
on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve
his country in confusion.
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lawyer could maximize her own payoff from multi-period games by
continuing to cooperate with agency lawyers. The lawyer will not
want to be looked upon as a "traitor" or a "snitch" when a bad client
comes along, even if doing so might significantly increase her value to
"good" clients. 7 If so, when clients defect in underlying games, law-
yers are more likely to follow suit and defect in their own games as
well. Thus, at times, ideological norms within the legal profession will
steer play between lawyers to an equilibrium of mutual defection.
One of the most powerful influences on whether play between law-
yers and regulators will evolve toward mutual cooperation, mutual de-
fection, or some other equilibrium, is whether the players have an
opportunity to negotiate before play begins.98 Negotiation of contrac-
tual commitments that are clearly understandable and enforceable can
shift play from focal points suggested by rules of professional conduct
and ideological norms toward new modes of behavior. Contractual
commitments can also change the rules of the game by changing the
players' payoffs or the range of strategies available to players. The
process of creating these new rules is where game theory meets Coa-
sian contractual theory, the topic of the next part of this Article.
III. Ti-e CONTRACTARIAN PARADIGM
A. Is There a Role for Lawyers in Contractual Theory?
Coasian contractual theory has significantly influenced legal schol-
arship in such areas as business organizations, securities regulation,
and contracts. 99 Contractual theory also contributes greatly to our un-
derstanding of game theory by modeling the process by which players
can steer play toward an equilibrium of joint cooperation as they ne-
gotiate their respective strategies. 100 Even a single-round prisoner's
dilemma game may settle into a cooperative equilibrium if the players
are allowed an opportunity to commit to cooperate.' 0' Although Coa-
2 The Trial Of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed., Albion Press, London 1821),
cited in, Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 177 (1978).
97. See Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In
Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 221, 267-74 (1995).
98. See supra note 74.
99. See Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract:
A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1992); see also Robert E. Scott,
The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1155 (1990) (discussing preferred default rules for damages in contracts).
100. See supra note 74. As Gilson and Mnookin observe in their game theoretic
analysis of litigation, "[b]oth parties to a lawsuit with a prisoner's dilemma payoff
schedule would like to hire cooperative lawyers because that allows them to commit
to a cooperative strategy." Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 22, at 525. The same is true
for both parties to a finm/agency relationship. The contractarian paradigm discussed
in this Article should explain how firm lawyers and agency lawyers can reach agree-
ment about exactly what is a cooperative strategy for each.
101. "[Tjhe set of Nash equilibria contains the set of credibly self-enforcing agree-
ments that could be made." Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 32.
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sian contractual theory appears in scholarship related to the conduct
of lawyers in such matters as insider trading' ° and whistleblowing, 3
the relationship between lawyers and regulators is not generally
viewed in contractual terms. A contractarian, however, would view
the regulatory process as part of a "bargain" between regulators, regu-
lated firms, and lawyers.
The role of lawyers in the contractarian paradigm, however, is se-
verely limited by the fact that lawyers ordinarily do not contract with
persons who are not their clients; indeed, contractual commitments to
third parties often are believed to compromise the lawyer-client rela-
tionship."° In the relatively few scenarios where lawyers may commit
themselves to third parties-for example, through opinion letters and
escrow agreements-lawyers can induce joint cooperation between
their clients and third parties by making credible promises where
promises from their clients would not be credible. 0 5 Lawyers, how-
ever, could bargain far more extensively if they had freedom to opt in
to standards of professional conduct that expand their own obligation
to protect third parties. Lawyers thus could induce third parties, such
as regulators, to play cooperative strategies in firm/agency games in
return for the lawyers committing themselves in advance to coopera-
tive strategies that discourage client defection and mitigate injury in
the event that a client defects."° On the other hand, immutable rules
of professional conduct may prevent the lawyer from committing her-
self to a cooperative strategy ex ante by imposing a client loyalty norm
102. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1 (1993) (discussing whether lawyers could con-
tractually commit to clients that they would not trade on inside information).
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have modeled ethical rules governing attorney
conflicts of interest as default rules that reduce contracting costs between lawyers and
their clients. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of
Conflict of Interest Regulation (unpublished manuscript).
103. See Painter, supra note 97, at 256-57.
104. Model Rule 1.7(b) provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person ...." Model Rules, supra note
83, Rule 1.7(b) (emphasis added).
105. An opinion letter may commit a lawyer to make representations about certain
factual or legal circumstances, at least to the extent of the lawyer's knowledge as of
the date of the opinion, and an escrow agreement may commit the lawyer acting as
escrow agent to pay money over to a third party when certain conditions are met.
Such instruments are most commonly used in circumstances where a similar promise
from the lawyer's client would not be credible. The ABA has sought to standardize
opinion language and procedures. See ABA Comm. on Legal Op., Third-Party Legal
Opinion Report Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law,
American Bar Association, 47 Bus. Law. 167, 169, 176 (1991). This ABA Opinion
Accord is sometimes referred to as the "Silverado Accord." While a legal opinion
does not have to conform to the guidelines set forth in the Silverado Accord, the
Accord seeks to define preferred opinion writing practice, and an opinion letter may
incorporate provisions of the Accord by reference. I& at 170.
106. For example, lawyers could commit themselves er ante to blow the whistle if a
client lies to regulators. See Painter, supra note 97, at 258.
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in which lawyer defection almost always automatically follows client
defection. In such situations, unless the regulated firm alone is able to
convince the regulator that it will play a cooperative strategy, the
agency lawyer will assume that a firm's lawyer will defect along with
the firm, and joint lawyer defection is the most likely outcome.
B. The Role of Lawyers in the Paradigm of Enforced Self
Regulation
1. Self Regulation
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite apply the insights of Ronald Coase
to observe that government should only produce "public goods," such
as regulatory enforcement, when "internal production" is cheaper
than "external contracting."' 7 Self regulation, if monitored by regu-
lators and enforced with rewards and punishments, can be a form of
"subcontracting regulatory functions to private actors."'' 08 Ayres and
Braithwaite propose a model of "enforced self regulation" that in-
volves negotiation between the state and individual firms in which
each firm submits its own "tailored" standards for approval by regula-
tors "to avoid harsher (and less tailored) standards imposed by the
state."'1 9 Ayres and Braithwaite recognize that the independence of
each firm's compliance group-the persons within a firm responsible
for enforcing the standards-is an important component of self regu-
lation, but can never be fully guaranteed. They suggest that "[t]he
best guarantee of compliance group independence is external: making
the failure to report unrectified violations a crime."" 0
As pointed out in the game theoretic discussion in part II of this
Article, a firm's compliance with regulation can be facilitated,
although by no means guaranteed, by the firm's lawyers. This part
discusses how making firm lawyers part of the self regulation "con-
tract" between regulatory agencies and firms facilitates compliance
with regulatory standards. Moreover, in an enforced self regulation
regime similar to that described by Ayres and Braithwaite, lawyers
could also play a critical role in negotiations between the state and
107. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 102-03.
108. Id. at 103.
109. Id at 101. Ayres and Braithwaite list several strengths of an enforced self
regulation model compared with the traditional model of agency promulgated and
agency enforced regulation: "rules would be tailored to match the company;" "rules
would adjust more quickly to changing business environments;" "regulatory innova-
tion would be fostered;" "rules would be more comprehensive in their coverage;"
"companies would be more committed to the rules they wrote;" "confusion and costs
that flow from having two rule books-private and public-would be reduced;"
"business would bear more of the costs of its own regulation;" "more offenders would
be caught more often;" "offenders who were caught would be disciplined in a larger
proportion of cases than under traditional government regulation;" "it would be eas-
ier for prosecutors to obtain convictions;" and "compliance would become the path of
least corporate resistance" for most regulated entities. Id. at 110-16.
110. Id at 127.
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individual firms submitting their own "tailored" standards for ap-
proval. Although the relationship between lawyers and regulators
usually is not viewed in "contractual" terms, Ayres and Braithwaite's
insights into the contractual aspects of the relationship between regu-
lators and firms can be applied to lawyers as well.
Enforced self regulation of lawyers' clients thus could be much
more effective if carried out in conjunction with similar regulation of
the lawyers. Ayres and Braithwaite discuss the role of firm sponsored
compliance groups in the self enforcement stage of the regulatory pro-
cess, but only speak briefly of the professionals-lawyers and account-
ants-who are inevitably a part of the internal compliance groups at
most firms. Integrating professionals into the enforced self regulation
paradigm, however, could dramatically increase the success of this
regulatory model, particularly in circumstances where regulators do
not trust firms to police themselves. If professionals negotiate with
regulators predictable standards for self-regulation, they can establish
the level of trust required for an enforced self regulation regime to
flourish for their clients as well.
2. The Lawyer-Agency "Contract"
Regulators sometimes insist that, although all lawyers are bound by
codes of professional responsibility, lawyers who choose to represent
regulated clients, and particularly lawyers who undertake to make cer-
tain disclosures for those clients, assume additional obligations."'
Voluntarily assumed obligations thus can be as important to regula-
tors' view of lawyers' responsibilities as they are to ordinary contracts.
Nonetheless, regulators for the most part do not form actual contracts
with lawyers setting forth exactly what lawyers' responsibilities are. 12
Instead, regulators rely on vague understandings that far too often be-
come misunderstandings, leading to what the title of this Article refers
to as "the uneasy relationship between regulators and regulatory
lawyers."
In In re Carter & Johnson,"3 the SEC inferred a "quasi contractual"
understanding from its relationship with an entire group of lawyers,
those who practice securities law. Carter and Johnson represented
National Telephone over the course of several years during which Na-
tional ignored Carter's and Johnson's legal advice and persisted in re-
peated violations of the securities laws, including issuing false press
releases, sending misleading letters to shareholders, and filing mis-
leading disclosure statements with the SEC. The SEC's Release
clearly stated that Carter and Johnson each had an obligation to take
affirmative steps to correct National's disclosure violations, such as
111. See infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
112. But see infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
113. In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1 82,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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approaching other members of National's board of directors or re-
signing." 4 The Release also recognized, however, that adequate stan-
dards for professional conduct in securities practice had not been
sufficiently developed at the time,"15 an implicit acknowledgment that
Carter and Johnson arguably were playing by the default rules in gen-
eralized codes of professional responsibility rather than by the more
specific and stringent rules the SEC sought to impose on securities
lawyers. Thus, the SEC did not sanction Carter and Johnson under
Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice," 6 and instead dictated the terms
that lawyers who practice at the bar of the SEC should abide by in the
future:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of
a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure require-
ments, his continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance." 17
The SEC did not seek to impose this duty to take "prompt steps to
end the client's noncompliance" on all lawyers, but only on lawyers
who choose to accept "significant responsibilities in the effectuation of
a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the fed-
eral securities laws." In return for allowing lawyers to assume "signifi-
cant responsibilities" with respect to securities filings, the SEC will
require the lawyers to play by its rules, not merely the rules of profes-
sional responsibility applicable to lawyers generally." 8 As the SEC
had pointed out in 1960,1"9 and again in 1973, "The right to appear
and practice before this Commission as an attorney is, like member-
ship in the bar itself, a privilege burdened with conditions."' 20 The
114. Id. Carter and Johnson warned National against this conduct, but did not re-
sign or inform the SEC of their client's violations. Id. at 84,162-64.
115. Id. at 84,172.
116. Under Rule 2(e), the SEC may disqualify from appearing or practicing before
it, temporarily or permanently, any attorney found to have violated or aided and abet-
ted a violation of the securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder. 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.102(e)(1)(iii) (1996).
117. In re Carter & Johnson, at 84,172.
118. At least as interpreted by the ABA, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
do not require either that a lawyer resign when a client engages in illegal conduct or
that the lawyer make a report to the client's board of directors. See supra note 80.
119. In re Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960).
120. Id. at 371 (quoted in In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973) (Rule 2(e)
proceeding), affd without opinion, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The preamble to
the Model Rules refers to a lawyer as "an officer of the legal system." Model Rules,
supra note 83, Preamble. In choosing a practice area, a lawyer can be deemed to have
chosen a particular legal system in which to practice and to have implicitly agreed to
play by that system's rules. "A lawyer representing a client, as an officer of the legal
system, must honor the obligations to the system by adhering to its rules. When the
system in question is a regulated industry, the lawyer no longer has the option of
choosing rules from the litigation system." W. Frank Newton, A Lawyer's Duty to the
Legal System and to a Client: Drawing the Line, 35 S. Tex. LJ. 701, 720 (1994).
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SEC's conditions, as stated in In re Carter & Johnson, require the law-
yer for a recalcitrant client that is violating the securities laws, at a
minimum, to confront the client's board of directors with the impro-
priety or to resign.
In In re Kern, 2' Allied Corporation, while the subject of a tender
offer, began negotiations with a potential suitor, an event that had to
be disclosed to the SEC.122 The SEC alleged that Allied and Allied's
lawyer, George Kern, failed to disclose these negotiations.123 The
usual or default rule is that the client, not the lawyer, is responsible for
fulfilling its own disclosure obligations. 124  The administrative law
judge, however, found that Kern had:
assumed sole responsibility for determining when an amendment to
Allied's Schedule 14D-9 would be filed .... In the usual relation-
ship of lawyer and client Kern would have had only the responsibil-
ity of giving legal advice to ... officers of Allied who in turn would
have made the decisions whether amendments to Allied's Schedule
14D-9 were required. When Kern accepted discretionary authority
to make those decisions he also accepted the responsibility the Al-
lied officers had for compliance with Rule 14D-9 .... 2'
It was Kern's choice to accept responsibility for disclosure which re-
quired him to disclose the merger negotiations. Once he assumed an
obligation of a client 2 6 to disclose certain facts, the SEC claimed that
he was required to disclose these facts in a timely manner. 2 7
In In re Fishbein,28 the OTS alleged that lawyers at Kaye, Scholer
also failed to live up to their assumed disclosure obligations.12 9 As the
121. Exchange Act Admin. Proc. File No. 3-6869 [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342, at 89,580 (Nov. 14, 1988).
122. Id. at 89,580-82.
123. The SEC held that George Kern "caused" his client Allied Signal to violate
§ 14(d)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") by advising
Allied not to disclose negotiations for the sale of a substantial amount of assets to a
potential "white knight" when Allied was the subject of a tender offer. See id. at
89,589. The discussion herein of the Kern and Kaye, Scholer matters makes some of
the same points as the discussion of these cases in Painter, supra note 97, at 293-95.
124. Except in very limited circumstances, a lawyer ordinarily should not disclose
confidential client information without the client's consent. See Model Rule, supra 83,
Rule 1.6.
125. In re Kern, at 89,592.
126. Section 12 of the Exchange Act as interpreted by Rule 12g-1, requires a com-
pany to register its shares with the SEC if (i) the company's stock is listed on a na-
tional exchange, or (ii) at the close of its fiscal year, the corporation had both a class
of equity securities held by more than 500 shareholders and more than $5 million in
assets. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1995). Other provisions of the Exchange Act, including the
tender offer rules, also apply to companies registered under Section 12. Id.
127. This holding was never reviewed by the SEC on the merits, as the proceeding
was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. In re Kern, at 89,585-86.
128. See Notice of Charges, OTS v. Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992) [herein-
after Notice of Charges].
129. Unlike SEC proceedings against lawyers, OTS actions have alleged that law-
yers breached duties to their clients as well as to third parties. Harris Weinstein &
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
OTS' Acting Chief Counsel stated: "If a lawyer chooses to make
statements of fact to an examiner in place of a client, as Peter Fishbein
and Kaye, Scholer did in representing Lincoln Savings, then the law-
yer is subject to the same disclosure requirements as the client. 130
Again, as Harris Weinstein, former Chief Counsel of the OTS, has
pointed out: "[The Kaye, Scholer matter] was a case where the law-
yers were alleged to have assumed an unusual responsibility for fac-
tual representations made to the regulators .. . . 131 Kaye, Scholer
thus assumed the "unusual responsibility" to make the same disclo-
sures about Lincoln's operations which were required to be made by
Lincoln.13  Kaye, Scholer, according to the OTS, indicated its willing-
ness to assume this responsibility by "demand[ing] that all FHLBB
requests for information made in connection with the 1986 Examina-
tion be directed to... Kaye, Scholer" instead of to Lincoln. 33 Kaye,
Scholer also chose to disclose facts to regulators in place of Lincoln. 13
Thus, "the OTS action asserted that Kaye, Scholer conducted the rep-
resentation in a manner that resulted in Kaye, Scholer sponsoring or
otherwise taking on its client's duties of disclosure. Kaye, Scholer
then had to comply with those duties.' 1 35 In the aftermath of Kaye,
Scholer, even the ABA acknowledged that a lawyer may thus agree to
assume a client's disclosure obligations:
Michael P. Socarras, Lincoln Savings and Loan: An Engine of Professional Liability
29-30 (Practicing Law Institute 1993). Also, some of the charges in Kaye, Scholer
were not derived from the lawyers' assumed obligations. These charges include alle-
gations that the lawyers themselves lied to regulators and that they represented Lin-
coln despite a known conflict of interest arising from Kaye, Scholer's representation
of Lincoln's parent, American Continental Corporation. See Notice of Charges, supra
note 128, at 25.
130. Carolyn B. Lieberman, OTS's Position on Lawyer Ethics, Wall St. J., Jan. 12,
1994, at All.
These enforcement actions were not brought because lawyers are required,
either in the professional rules or by the OTS regulation, to volunteer infor-
mation about a client. Rather, they are based on the principle that if a law-
yer chooses to speak, or to sponsor a statement, the lawyer may not do so in
a false or misleading manner, and he or she must counsel the client against
doing so.
Carolyn B. Lieberman et al., Professional Conduct in Representing a Regulated Indus-
try: The OTS Experience, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 607, 628 (1994) [hereinafter Lieberman,
Professional Conduct].
131. Weinstein & Socarras, supra note 129, at 25.
132. Kaye, Scholer thus assumed Lincoln's obligation to maintain accurate and
complete accounting and other records of all business transactions, Notice of Charges,
supra note 128, at 20 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-1(c) (1986)), was prohibited from
knowingly making any false or misleading statements to the FHLBB or "omitting to
state any material fact concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the FHLBB,"
id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 563.18(b)(1) (1986)), and was prohibited from "engaging in any
dilatory, obstructionist, egregious, contemptuous, or unethical or improper profes-
sional conduct before the FHLBB." Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a)(3)-(4) (1986)).
133. Notice of Charges, supra note 128, at 20.
134. Id.
135. Lieberman, Professional Conduct, supra note 130. at 629.
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[A] lawyer may put herself in a situation where she has assumed
[such] obligations. When the lawyer is the only individual to deal
directly with the bank examiners during the course of the examina-
tion, takes full responsibility for gathering factual information and
preparing the client's submissions to the regulators, and cuts off the
regulator from access the regulator otherwise might have to em-
ployees or the regulated entity, the lawyer may well have taken on
the client's own obligation under the regulations to respond."
6
Nonetheless, the responsibilities assumed by the lawyers at Kaye,
Scholer, like those assumed by George Kern, and those read into the
SEC's "contract" with the entire securities bar in Carter & Johnson,
were ambiguous. Unlike the clearly defined rules of an enforced self
regulation regime, these assumed responsibilities were inferred from
conduct signalling that lawyers would be responsible for their clients'
compliance efforts. Just as an implied-in-fact contract is more difficult
to enforce than an explicit agreement, 137 however, implied under-
standings between regulators and lawyers do not provide clear gui-
dance for lawyer conduct or for enforcement and disciplinary actions
against lawyers. Professors Goetz and Scott observe that indetermi-
nate signals are a dilemma in relational contracting generally, and
that: "interpretive disputes will essentially be a lottery until the state
provides the requisite instruments for more accurate signalling. To
advance the normative objectives of contract law, courts must pro-
mote the evolution of predefined invocations that clearly trigger such
136. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 375
(1993) ("The Lawyer's Obligation to Disclose Information Adverse to the Client in
the Context of a Bank Examination."); Lieberman, Professional Conduct, supra note
130, at 629.
137. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see
also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 384-86 (Cal. 1988) (enforcing im-
plied-in-fact contract that employee would not be dismissed except for cause). Courts
have shown a "willingness to 'consider the entire relationship of the parties, and to
find that facts and circumstances establish a contract which cannot be terminated by
the employer without cause."' Foley, 765 P.2d at 386 (quoting Alfred W. Blumrosen,
United States Report in Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer
Disciplinary Power, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 428, 432 (1964)). Although it is usually the
employee subject to discipline who alleges an implied-in-fact contract covering dis-
charge, these cases provide an interesting parallel to implied-in-fact understandings
used by regulators to discipline lawyers. Indeed, difficulties of interpretation that
arise when implied-in-fact terms are read into commercial and employment contracts
are very similar to the problems of vagueness and enforceability that arise when regu-
lators infer new lawyer undertakings from lawyer conduct. For a discussion of im-
plied-in-fact contracts generally, see Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in
Contract Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131, 1171-87 (1995) (discussing judicial retreat from
classic implied contract doctrine); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Con-
tract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261,264-73 (1985) (discussing interaction between implied
and express formulations and identifying errors which reduce contract reliability: i.e.,
formulation error, administrative error, ambiguity, incompleteness, inconsistency, in-
terpretation error and ill-fitting formulations).
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equitable resolutions of interpretational disputes."'138 This same prob-
lem of indeterminate signals and indefinite standards is endemic to
the current state of relational contracting between lawyers and
regulators.
An enforced self regulation regime in which lawyers and regulators
clearly and precisely contract around regulatory defaults would be su-
perior to this vague "quasi-contractual" regime with its inevitable mis-
understandings between lawyers and regulators. Indeed, the
indefinite standards that regulators read into lawyers' undertakings on
behalf of clients have sparked substantial opposition from the organ-
ized bar.'39 This opposition is fueled by the fact that regulators equiv-
ocate at times,'140 and at other times impose harsh sanctions for breach
of understandings they believe they have reached with lawyers. 141 In-
stead of urging lawyer participation in crafting precise contractual
commitments with regulators, the bar has responded by adopting a
very narrow vision of lawyers' role in client self regulation. 142 Regula-
138. Goetz & Scott, supra note 137, at 320.
139. The legal profession has been staunchly resistant to efforts by regulators to
impose higher responsibilities on lawyers in the regulatory arena, and has steadfastly
resisted efforts by regulators to discipline attorneys. As early as 1975, the ABA stated
that:
Efforts by the government to impose responsibility upon lawyers to assure
the quality of their clients' compliance with the law or to compel lawyers to
give advice resolving all doubts in favor of regulatory restrictions would
evoke serious and far-reaching disruption in the role of the lawyer as coun-
selor, which would be detrimental to the public, clients and the legal
profession.
Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1054 (1988) (quoting ABA Report
to the House of Delegates, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law Recom-
mendation, 31 Bus. Law. 544, 545 (1975)). Similar sentiments were expressed when
the SEC conducted its proceedings in Carter & Johnson in 1981. See Stephen J. Fried-
man, Reflections on Carter-Johnson, Thirteenth Annual Institute On Securities Regu-
lation 297 (Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al. eds., 1982); Werner Kronstein, The Carter-
Johnson Case: A Higher Threshold for SEC Actions Against Lawyers, 9 Sec. Reg. J.
293 (1981). The SEC was also criticized for its proceedings in In re Kern in the late
1980s. See Michael R. Klein, SEC Reopens Old Wounds with its Proceeding Against
George C. Kern, Jr., Insights, Sept. 1987, at 32. Most recently, the OTS was criticized
in response to the Notice of Charges against Kaye, Scholer. See Don J. DeBenedictis,
The Big Freeze, 78 A.B.A. J. 57 (1992); Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, How a Big
Law Firm Was Brought to Its Knees by Zealous Regulators, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1992,
at Al, A6.
140. SEC releases subsequent to the Carter & Johnson release have done much to
confuse lawyers about the scope of a lawyer's affirmative obligations. As the SEC has
pointed out, "[tihe Commission has not formally addressed the expansion or modifi-
cation of the standard enunciated in Carter and Johnson and intends to take no fur-
ther action in that regard. Since Carter and Johnson, the Commission has not
attempted to set professional standards of conduct in Rule 2(e) proceedings, but has
relied on a showing of violations of the securities laws." Adoption of Amendment to
Rule 2(e)(7), Securities Act Release No. 6783 [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,248, at 89,244 n.31 (July 7, 1988).
141. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re
Fishbein.
142. See supra notes 80, 139.
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tors are thus locked in an indefinite struggle with a recalcitrant bar,
and the resulting stalemate continues to marginalize lawyers in the
enforced self-regulation paradigm.
Lawyers and agencies also trust each other less when they struggle
over vague rules and sporadic punishments. When agencies treat law-
yers in a manner that lawyers perceive as unfair, this perception inter-
feres with efforts to negotiate future standards, particularly if lawyers
rebel against context-specific rules14 3 that they perceive to be at the
root of unpredictable regulatory standards. As lawyers retreat to a
more absolutist and less context-specific view of their own responsibil-
ities,'" their perception of what is fair will harden in future dialogue
with agencies over rules of professional conduct.1 45 Absent a change
in attitude on the part of both regulators and lawyers, Ayres and
Braithwaite were perhaps correct to devote very little of their text to
the role of lawyers in an enforced self regulation paradigm.146
3. Enforced Self Regulation of Lawyers
A true contractual regime, on the other hand, could facilitate ex-
plicit agreements between lawyers and regulators and thus substan-
tially improve lawyers' roles in enforcing client self regulation. In an
enforced self regulation regime, government agencies before which
lawyers practice would allow individual lawyers, law firms, or bar as-
sociations, to devise their own rules of professional conduct to be ap-
proved by the regulators. These "tailored" rules would for the most
part supplement existing rules of professional responsibility, although
143. See Wldns, Legal Realism for Lawyers, supra note 16, at 485-86 (urging that
context-specific rules replace traditional model's commitment to general, universally
applicable ethical rules); Wflkins, Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, supra note
16, at 1151-60 (same). The context-specific rules suggested by Wfldins can be a useful
contribution of regulatory agencies to the regulation of lawyers. It is important, how-
ever, that these rules are not applied on an ad hoc basis ex post, but instead are clearly
established ex ante.
144. See supra notes 80, 139.
145. As Professor Kreps notes:
[R]etrospection is probably a crucial element to bargaining. What a player
believes is just or fair or his due and what is due his rivals in a bargaining
situation is likely to be very important in determining the outcome of a par-
ticular negotiation. And such notions are apt to be determined by past ex-
periences, precedents, and the like.
Kreps, Game Theory, supra note 4, at 153.
146. Instead, Ayres and Braithwaite envision a tripartite regime where public inter-
est groups have a critical role in avoiding industry capture of regulators and policing
industry compliance. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 54-100. This Article
explores ways in which the bar can be such a public interest group. Agency lawyers
have a responsibility to represent the public interest. Firm lawyers, although they
represent their clients rather than the public interest, still perform many of the func-
tions of public interest groups if they encourage client compliance with both the letter
and spirit of regulation. See David Dana, Environmental Lawyers and the Public Ser-
vice Model of Lawyering, 74 Or. L. Rev. 57 (1995) (discussing client service and public
service models of lawyering and the impediments to public service lawyering).
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in some cases lawyers would be allowed to "contract out of" rules of
professional responsibility that unduly narrow their responsibility to
participate in a client's self regulation regime. 147 Regulators would
determine what rules should be required of all lawyers practicing
before their agency (i.e., prohibiting lawyers from misrepresenting
facts or forwarding misleading documents to the regulators). Beyond
this minimum standard, rules requiring a higher standard of lawyer
diligence or disclosure would result in lawyers getting favorable regu-
latory treatment for their clients.
In an enforced self regulation regime, regulatory defaults could be
set as majoritarian rules-rules that are appropriate for a majority of
lawyers practicing before a particular agency-or as penalty default
rules-more stringent default rules designed to encourage lawyers to
negotiate their own tailor-made rules with the agency. 4 8 Alterna-
tively, in circumstances where tailor made rules might be too confus-
ing or idiosyncratic, regulators could design different sets of default
rules for lawyers to choose between. 49 For example, rules could re-
quire a lawyer:
(1) to blow the whistle 5 0 or to make a "noisy withdrawal''5 when
a client is engaged in a crime or fraud;
147. A good example would be Model Rule 1.6, prohibiting disclosure of client
confidences and effectively precluding lawyer whistleblowing. See Painter, supra note
97, at 244 n.95.
148. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 108; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Fill-
ing Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J.
87, 91-93 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Default Rules]. A majoritarian rule
might require that a lawyer resign in the face of client refusal to desist from egregious
misconduct. A penalty default rule, on the other hand, might require that the lawyer
disclose the misconduct to regulators.
149. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 108-09. As Ayres and Braithwaite
point out, corporate law in the United States allows corporate management and
shareholders to choose between a variety of forms of corporate governance by choos-
ing where to incorporate. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. Econ. & Organization 225 (1985). I have suggested pre-
viously that lawyers be allowed to choose between a variety of rules of professional
conduct concerning such controversial topics as whistleblowing by opting in to profes-
sional conduct rules used in another jurisdiction-for example, voluntarily agreeing to
be bound by New Jersey's rule requiring lawyers to disclose client confidences if nec-
essary to prevent a crime or fraud. See Painter, supra note 97, at 256-61.
150. Id at 244-45; Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of
Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 49 SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming
1996) (proposing default rules for lawyer disclosure of corporate fraud to independent
directors and opt-in rules for disclosure to the SEC).
151. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 366
(1992) ("Withdrawal When a Lawyer's Services Will Otherwise be Used to Perpetrate
a Fraud."); see also Model Rules, supra note 83, Rule 1.6, cmt. 16 ("Neither this Rule
nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document,
affirmation, or the like."); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Blowing the Whistle and Raising the Red Flag,
63 Or. L. Rev. 455, 483-84 (1984) (arguing that notice of withdrawal essentially
amounts to disclosure and thus accomplishes indirectly an objective that earlier drafts
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(2) to opine to regulators on a periodic basis that a client is in com-
pliance with specified regulations;
(3) to share certain types of confidential client information with
regulators (without otherwise waiving the attorney-client privilege);
(4) to consult with specialized co-counsel when certain technical is-
sues arise; or
(5) to conduct due diligence under specified circumstances (for ex-
ample, to inquire into the financial soundness of a thrift by commu-
nicating with the thrift's accountants and lawyers, before working
on offering materials distributed to investors in a limited gartner-
ship of which the thrift or an affiliate is a general partner). S2
Although regulators may refuse to deal with lawyers who decline to
choose certain rules, in most circumstances regulators only need to
know ahead of time what rules lawyers have chosen. In the game-
theoretic context, lawyers who want to steer play between themselves
and regulators, as well as between their clients and regulators, into a
joint cooperation equilibrium may choose rules designed to assure
regulators that they and their clients are cooperating.
Law firms already negotiate detailed consent agreements with the
OTS in settlement of disputes over lawyer misconduct in representing
insured depository institutions. These consent agreements typically
require, among other things, that the law firm: (i) review the finances
of new banking clients; (ii) enter into written agreements with bank-
ing clients concerning the scope of the law firm's engagement; (iii)
have a partner with ten or more years of banking-law experience su-
pervise preparation of legal opinions covering compliance with bank-
ing laws as well as have a second partner approve such opinions; (iv)
monitor conflicts of interest; (v) implement procedures to ensure that
each attorney assigned to a banking matter has sufficient expertise;
and (vi) adopt other procedures that reduce the risk of future banking
violations.'53  The SEC also has on occasion negotiated consent
agreements requiring prospective measures to avoid future viola-
tions."s Although these consent agreements have been used to settle
allegations about past lawyer misconduct, similar agreements could be
of Rule 1.6 by the Kutak Commission had sought to accomplish directly-allowing
lawyers to disclose client confidences to prevent a crime or fraud).
152. See Schneyer, Bar Corporatism, supra note 19, at 656 ("The Model Rules are
too vague and general to provide guidance on this issue."). The FDIC has asserted
that lawyers have just such a duty. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 749
(9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
153. Scbneyer, Bar Corporatism, supra note 19, at 645 n.27 (citing In re Fishbein,
OTS AP-92-24, 2-17 (Mar. 11, 1992) (Order to Cease and Desist for Affirmative
Relief from Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler)).
154. Schneyer, Bar Corporatism, supra note 19, at 649 n.43 (citing In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,981 (July 2, 1979) (recounting that almost every
member of the respondent law firm was aware of at least one of a client's securities
law violations; the consent agreement required the respondent law firm to adopt pro-
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negotiated ex ante by regulators and law firms seeking favorable regu-
latory treatment of their clients.15 1
Furthermore, there has already been some negotiation of profes-
sional standards ex ante between agencies and groups representing
lawyers in particular practice areas. Professor Schneyer points out
several examples of what he calls "bar corporatism," or the "develop-
ment of standards for a particular field of law practice through bilat-
eral negotiations or dialogue between an ABA entity and an
interested government agency.' 15 6 TWo specific examples Schneyer
mentions are negotiation between the ABA Taxation Section and the
Treasury Department of standards for "negative" tax opinions (opin-
ions which decline to opine that tax benefits from an investment are
more likely than not to be allowed),"5 7 and unilateral development by
the ABA of a Third Party Legal Opinion Report which was later in-
corporated by federal banking regulators into consent decrees with
individual lawyers and firms. 15 8
Outside of the consent decree context, however, regulators have not
engaged in bilateral negotiation of tailored standards with individual
lawyers or law firms. Regulators instead rely on either applicable
rules of professional conduct from state disciplinary authorities, rules
or statutes imposed on lawyers in a particular practice area, or occa-
sionally rules negotiated with the ABA or other bar associations. The
one exception is when regulators presume that certain lawyers "as-
sumed" clients' disclosure obligations, precisely the type of implied
understanding that has caused great misunderstanding between law-
yers and regulators. Otherwise, the same rules are presumed to apply
to all lawyers, or at least to all lawyers in a particular practice area,
without regard for the amount of responsibility individual lawyers
want to assume or their clients are willing to pay them to assume.
One disadvantage of this "one rule for all lawyers" approach is that
a single rule will not maximize regulatory compliance in the context of
cedures that would ensure that future securities filings would include all material facts
about a client known to any one member of the firm)).
155. For a discussion of problems with enforcing agreements negotiated ex ante by
agencies and firms, see infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
156. Schneyer, Bar Corporatism, supra note 19, at 658.
157. Id. at 657. Although the Treasury initially sought to ban such opinions, the
negotiated compromise permitted negative opinions provided the lawyer has a rea-
sonable basis to believe that tax benefits will be allowed and the negative conclusions
are prominently noted in the opinion. IL These standards were incorporated into
both the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Opinion
346 (1982) and Treasury regulations making these guidelines enforceable in IRS disci-
plinary proceedings. Id. at 657-58 & nn.74 & 76 (citing Tax Shelter Opinions, 49 Fed.
Reg. 6719, 7116 (1984) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.33. 10.516), 10.52 and 10.76
(1994)).
158. Schneyer, Bar Corporatism, supra note 19, at 658 & n.77; see also Painter,
supra note 97, at 227 & nn. 19 & 20 (discussing the ABA Third Party Legal Opinion
Report).
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all lawyer-client relationships.159 Moreover, lawyers may ignore a rule
imposed on them if they would have rejected the rule in bilateral ne-
gotiations with regulators. 160 If regulators cannot predict which law-
yers will obey the rule, compliance is unlikely to be rewarded, making
enforcement depend upon detection and punishment of lawyers who
break the rule. Finally, immutable rules can be very unclear when
drafted in circumstances where different constituencies that partici-
pate in the rule-making process cannot agree on the proper scope of a
lawyer's responsibilities. The result may be convoluted language that
reflects search for compromise rather than clarity, 161 as well as differ-
ent rules in different jurisdictions.'6 Regulators may in turn disagree
159. For example, the banking system would not necessarily be more secure if all
lawyers representing insured depository institutions were bound to blow the whistle
on client misconduct. Some lawyers would learn less about client misconduct and
thus have fewer opportunities to take remedial measures under the mandatory
whistleblowing rule. In the context of other lawyer-client relationships, however, a
whistleblowing rule would not seriously impair lawyer access to information and
would encourage client compliance. Painter, supra note 97, at 255-56.
160. See id. at 249-51.
161. Perhaps a good example is the disagreement among the drafters of the Ameri-
can Law Institute ("ALI") Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers ("the Re-
statement") on lawyer whistleblowing. Section 117A of the draft Restatement
permits disclosure to prevent death or serious bodily injury. The extent of disagree-
ment within the ALI, however, as within other bar associations, on lawyer
whistleblowing is best revealed by the two versions of § 117A(l)(b) that permit dis-
closure if a client has committed or intends to commit a crime or fraud which threat-
ens to cause substantial financial loss. The Chief Reporter and others preferred
permitting disclosure necessary to prevent the loss following a good faith attempt to
dissuade the client from committing the crime or fraud. The alternative version, pre-
ferred by the ALI Director upon consultation with a four-person ad hoc subcommit-
tee of the ALI Council, only permits disclosure of a crime or fraud "in the
commission of which the lawyer's services were or are being employed." ALl Pro-
posed Final Draft, § 117A. As the Reporters point out, the Section -[does] not apply
to a past act of a client, no matter how clearly illegal and serious, if all of the harmful
consequences of the act have already occurred," id. at cmt. a, and nowhere does § 117
require disclosure by the lawyer to prevent death, serious bodily injury or financial
loss. Apart from the circumstances described in §117, the ALI Preliminary Draft al-
lows a lawyer to disclose confidential client information only when a client consents
(§ 114), when other law so requires (§ 115), when reasonably necessary in the lawyer's
self defense of a malpractice or other action (§ 116), or in a dispute over the lawyer's
compensation (§ 117). See id.
162. Rules on disclosure of client confidences are perhaps a good example. See
supra note 92. Many state supreme courts have rewritten Model Rule 1.6 to allow or
even require whistleblowing in a broader range of circumstances, and the disarray in
the rules on this subject can be confusing for a practicing attorney. As Harris Wein-
stein, the former Chief Counsel of the OTS, has pointed out:
If you are in Wilmington, Delaware, confronted by a client's intended fraud-
ulent conduct that will likely cause substantial financial harm, and you prac-
tice law also in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, you are subject to three
different rules. New Jersey requires disclosure to the proper authorities.
Delaware forbids disclosure. Pennsylvania permits but does not require
disclosure.
Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. Ill. L
Rev. 53, 64 (1993); see also Del. Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 1.6 (1983)
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sharply with the bar's interpretation of chosen rules and courts may
refuse to definitively resolve this disagreement. 163
By contrast, lawyers and regulators have less at stake in default
rules and are likely to value clarity in such rules over content, knowing
that they can probably contract around a rule they dislike. The tailor-
made rules that lawyers and agencies agree to substitute for default
rules also should be clearer and easier to follow than immutable rules.
This clarity alone is a substantial benefit to those lawyers, perhaps a
majority of lawyers, who are not as concerned about the rules' sub-
stance as they are concerned about knowing what the rules are.
Thus, although regulators have often advocated lawyer gatekeep-
ing, there is considerable controversy over whether mandated lawyer
(following Model Rule 1.6); N.J. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992)(requiring a lawyer to disclose information necessary to prevent a client "from com-
mitting a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another."); Pa. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(c)(1)
(1992). Although many states follow Pennsylvania in making disclosure optional,
Florida follows New Jersey in requiring disclosure. See Fla. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1987).
To complicate matters further, the comment to Rule 1.16 allows a lawyer to with-
draw from a representation and then suggest, but not fully disclose, to third parties
the reasons for the withdrawal. See Model Rules, supra note 83, Rule 1.16 cmt. 3;
Rotunda, supra note 151.
163. See Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuise to Frame the Law and Others Frame
It to Their Will, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1075, 1079-91 (1993). Under the securities laws, for
example, some courts hold that attorneys have a duty to disclose before allowing a
sale of securities or a merger to go forward. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d
Cir. 1968) (involving an attorney enjoined against future violations of Section 10(b)
after misrepresentations discovered in offering circular drafted in part by attorney);
see also SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978)
(holding that an attorney should not close merger transaction if aware of changes to
financial statements not disclosed to the shareholders who approved the merger).
"Their silence was not only a breach of this duty to speak, but in addition lent the
appearance of legitimacy to the closing." Id. at 713 (citation omitted). Although the
Court was less clear on what the lawyers actually were obligated to say, "it is unneces-
sary to determine the precise extent of their obligations here, since... they took no
steps whatsoever to delay the closing." Id. Professor Kraakman observes that the
National Student Marketing court "seemingly adopted a protest duty," which would
raise the costs of wrongdoing, but stop short of preventing misconduct. Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 53, 59 n.11. (1986). Other courts hold that lawyers have a duty to dis-
close only to their clients. See, e.g., Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1048 (7th
Cir. 1990) (finding that attorney was not liable under 10(b) to investors in client's
fraudulent cattle leasing program because no duty to disclose); Abell v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that bond underwriter's counsel had
no duty to plaintiff purchasers of bonds which could form the basis for liability under
Section 10(b)); Barker v. Henderson, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
law firm was not liable to purchasers of bonds for fraud under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act because lawyer had no duty to disclose client issuer's fraud to purchas-
ers of bonds); see also Painter, supra note 97, at 236-37 (recounting that some courts
have held that attorneys have a duty to disclose fraud under the securities laws).
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gatekeeping' 14 is enforceable and cost effective."6 Instead of insisting
on uniform levels of lawyer gatekeeping or vague understandings with
lawyers about how much lawyer gatekeeping will take place, the con-
tractarian approach allows individual lawyers to specify to regulators
the level of responsibility that the lawyers are willing to accept for a
client's conduct. Regulators can "bargain" for enhanced lawyer re-
sponsibility by offering favorable regulatory treatment of lawyers' cli-
ents in return. Alternatively, regulators can insist that lawyers adopt
certain minimal standards of professional conduct in order to practice
before them. Regulators who strike this "bargain" may then insist
that when lawyers assume an obligation to monitor or otherwise be
responsible for a client's conduct, they should do so.
4. Sanctions in an Enforced Self-Regulation Regime
This enforced self-regulation regime, just like any other enforce-
ment regime, is effective only if sanctions are imposed for breaches.
Most regulatory agencies have procedures for disciplining attor-
neys,'" although, with the exception of the SEC, rarely is this author-
ity exercised. 67 Rule 2(e) proceedings by the SEC16s are more
common than proceedings by other administrative agencies, 69
164. See In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28, 1981); Notice of
Charges, supra note 128.
165. See Joseph C. Daley & Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adver-
saries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 Emory ..J. 747 (1975); Kraakman, supra note 163, at
60 ("Whistleblowing leaves all regulatory targets at the mercy of their private
monitors" and creates "incentive[s] to withhold information from potential
whistleblowers"). But see George H. Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers as Quasi-
Public Enforcers, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 637, 724 (1994) ("A mandatory disclosure
system would significantly contribute to maintaining a safe and sound banking system,
and it would help prevent a repeat of the rampant abuses uncovered during the past
decade in the savings and loan industry.").
166. See Emerson, supra note 19, at 188 n.112 (citing rules permitting disbarment
and other discipline of attorneys including: Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 C.F.Rt
§ 300.20(a) (1990); Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 14.4-.9
(1990)).
167. "Of the many federal agencies with a disciplinary rule, the SEC is virtually the
only one that uses it routinely." Emerson, supra note 19, at 234; see also id. at 235-37
n.381 (citing examples of sporadic disciplinary action against attorneys by the Patent
and Trademark Office, the ICC, the Department of the Treasury, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the FTC, the International Claims Commission, the IRS, the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the FCC, and the National Labor Rela-
tions Board).
168. Although SEC proceedings against attorneys have not been expressly author-
ized by Congress, the courts have not interfered with Rule 2(e) proceedings on the
grounds that the SEC has no authority to discipline attorneys. Id. at 191 (citing In re
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 47 S.E.C. 95, 109-17 (1979) (Karmel, RtS., SEC Com-
missioner, dissenting)); Daley & Karmel, supra note 165, at 763.
169. Roughly 139 Rule 2(e) cases were reported as of 1991; these cases involved
147 individual lawyers and four law firms. Emerson, supra note 19, at 175. During the
"peak years" of 1975-1977, 53 individual attorneys, 36% of the total, and three law
firms, 75% of the total, were subject to such proceedings. Id. at 176. By contrast, only
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although infrequent relative to the number of lawyers practicing se-
curities law. Moreover, the In re Carter & Johnson proceeding was
the last time the SEC used administrative proceedings to determine
initially a securities lawyer's professional obligations, 17° and since In
re Carter & Johnson the SEC has brought Rule 2(e) proceedings after
attorneys have already been found to have violated the securities
laws.17' In implementing Rule 2(e), the SEC thus declines to address
attorney conduct proactively by defining what exactly an attorney
should do about a client's violation.
The SEC also may sanction attorneys pursuant to the Remedies Act
under which it may:
enter an order requiring [a person who has or is about to violate the
securities laws], and any other person that is, was, or would be a
cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or
should have known would contribute to such violation, to cease and
desist from committing or causing such violation and any future vio-
lation of the same provision, rule or regulation....
Although the SEC has occasionally used the Remedies Act against
attorneys, 73 the statutory language requires a finding that the securi-
ties laws have been violated or are about to be violated to justify en-
tering an order to cease and desist.174 Thus, the provision does not
26 lawyers were subjected to Rule 2(e) proceedings during the 1980s. Id. at 176-77.
The decline in Rule 2(e) proceedings has been attributed to a number of factors,
including a decline in enforcement budgets and a shifting of enforcement priorities
under the Reagan and Bush administrations. Id. at 211-12.
170. Id. at 213. "With respect to attorneys, the Commission generally has not
sought to develop or apply independent standards of professional conduct.... [Tihe
Commission, as a matter of policy, generally refrains from using its administrative
forum to conduct de novo determinations of the professional obligations of attor-
neys." SEC Final Rule on Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1120 (BNA)
(July 15, 1988); see also Emerson, supra note 19, at 214 (describing the SEC as being
in a "2(e) sleep").
171. Emerson, supra note 19, at 213 n.292 ("[I]t has been commission policy for the
last seven years to only bring 2(e) proceedings against an attorney if he or she previ-
ously has been involved in another enforcement action." (comment of SEC General
Counsel Daniel Goelzer at Commission meeting on July 7, 1988)); SEC Final Rule on
Rule 2(e) Proceedings, supra note 170, at 1120-21 & n.31 ("Since Carter and Johnson,
the Commission has not attempted to set professional standards of conduct in Rule
2(e) proceedings, but has relied on a showing of violation of the securities laws.").
The SEC has also been very unclear regarding the standard of culpability required for
a Rule 2(e) proceeding and appears to hold attorneys to a different standard-scien-
ter-than accountants-negligence. See Painter & Duggan, supra note 150 (criticizing
the SEC for imposing inconsistent standards on the legal and accounting professions
without explaining why (citing Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1994).
173. See In re Jeffrey Feldman, Securities Act Release No. 7014, 1993 LEXIS 2401
(Sept. 20, 1993) (involving a lawyer for three Pakistani banks who "aided and abetted
and caused" violations of Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act when advising the
banks that an offering of rupee-denominated foreign exchange bearer certificates did
not involve securities required to be registered before sale in the United States).
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3 (1994).
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effectively address unprofessional as opposed to illegal conduct; an
attorney can only be sanctioned after an underlying violation has been
established and the attorney is found to have committed or to have
been the "cause" of the violation.
Finally, Section 104 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 amends Section 20 of the Exchange Act to expressly grant the
Commission authority to prosecute persons who aid and abet viola-
tions of the securities laws:
Prosecution of persons who aid and abet violations.
For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under para-
graph (1) or (3) of section 78(u)(d) of this title, any person that
knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in vio-
lation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation
issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such
provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance
is provided. 75
This amendment merely reaffirms the SEC's long-held view that it has
the authority to pursue aiders and abetters as well as primary viola-
tors, despite the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank176 that private litigants may not assert aiding and
abetting claims under the Exchange Act."r Although the SEC occa-
sionally prosecutes aiders and abetters, an underlying violation of the
securities laws is a predicate for any action against an alleged aider
and abetter, and such actions against lawyers are relatively rare. In-
deed, the most prominent case involving lawyers as aiders and abet-
ters, SEC v. National Student Marketing,7 ' was decided almost twenty
years ago. For the most part, federal courts have been very reluctant
to uphold claims against professionals for aiding and abetting viola-
tions of the securities laws.' 7 9
175. Act of Dec. 22, 1995, Pub. I. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737,
757 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f)).
176. 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (stating that no indication exists that Congress
intended to create a private cause of action for aiding and abetting under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
177. See id.
178. 457 F. Supp. 682, 715 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding that an attorney aided and abet-
ted, in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, by closing merger transaction with
knowledge that changes to financial statements were not disclosed to shareholders
who had voted to approve the merger). "Their silence was not only a breach of this
duty to speak, but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to the closing." Id. at
713 (citation omitted); see also SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486,493 (2d Cir. 1968) (revers-
ing injunction against future violations of Section 10(b) after misrepresentations dis-
covered in offering circular drafted in part by attorney). For an overview of attorney
liability under the securities laws, see Robert J. Haft, Liability of Attorneys and Ac-
countants for Securities Transactions (1991); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability
Under Securities Laws, 45 Sw. LJ. 711 (1991); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability
for Client Fraud, 1991 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1.
179. Much of the case law in this area was decided prior to Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994), and assumed a private right of action for
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Nonetheless, as sporadic as its rulings are, the SEC is probably the
most active regulatory agency when it comes to articulating and en-
forcing standards for attorney conduct. By way of contrast, until re-
cently banking regulators did little to define standards for a banking
lawyer's professional responsibilities. Regulators' handling of the sav-
ings and loan debacle is perhaps a good illustration of what should not
be done-apparent laxity toward both regulated institutions and their
lawyers followed by multi-million dollar asset attachments once con-
duct becomes particularly egregious.180
Furthermore, banking regulators have been turned back by the
courts when they seek to implement the type of "enforced self regula-
tion" described by Ayres and Braithwaite. For example, an agency's
attempt to enforce an agreement negotiated even with the principles
in a savings bank, much less with its lawyers, was held to exceed the
agency's authority. In Wachtel v. OTS,' s ' Hickory Investments
("Hickory") owned a majority stake in Investors Federal Savings
Bank (the "Bank"). When the individual petitioners together pur-
chased all of Hickory's stock, Hickory filed a notice of change of con-
trol with the FHLBB as well as a debt application seeking approval of
its plan to increase its stake in the Bank from 73 percent to 90 percent
using borrowed funds. The FHLBB approved Hickory's change of
control but conditioned its approval of the debt application on Hick-
ory's agreement that it would maintain the net worth of the Bank in
accord with regulations "'as now or hereinafter in effect' and would
"'infuse sufficient and additional equity capital to effect compliance
with such requirement. ' ' a82 Hickory's board then passed two resolu-
tions mirroring the language of the FHLBB approval notice. 18 3 When
Hickory apparently breached this agreement, the OTS subsequently
ordered petitioners to pay it $5.6 million, asserting that the written
condition required them to maintain the net worth of the savings bank
subsidiary. Petitioners sought review of this order and denied the
existence of an enforceable agreement. They alternatively contended
aiding and abetting a violation of the securities laws. See Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905
F.2d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1990); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir.
1988); Barker v. Henderson, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986). In Schatz v. Rosen-
berg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit held that where lawyers merely
"paper[ed] the deal" and "act[ed] as a scrivener," they could not be held liable either
for a direct violation of Section 10(b) or as an aider and abettor. Id. at 497.
180. See Macey & Miller, supra note 26, at 1132-39 (arguing that the OTS charged
Kaye, Scholer in part to cover up its own ineptitude). Federal deposit insurance cnte-
ria used to evaluate the regulators themselves create "strong incentives for regulators
to delay closing insolvent financial institutions. In fact, banking regulators have
strong incentives to delay identifying problem banks, to deny the severity of the bank-
ing crisis generally, and to postpone meaningful action for as long as possible regard-
less of the cost." Id. at 1133.
181. 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
182. Id. at 582-83 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 536.13 (1995)).
183. Id. at 582.
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that the underlying statute required the OTS to demonstrate either
unjust enrichment or reckless disregard of legal obligations before it
could impose such an order." 4 The D.C. Circuit sided with the peti-
tioners, finding that the "OTS' efforts in this case to circumvent the
statutory language strike us as attributable not so much to creative
lawyering as to excessive zeal. '"l" Judge Silberman, writing for the
Court, stated:
Perhaps the most vexing question that emerges is whether petition-
ers ever violated a "condition imposed in writing by the agency" or
a "written agreement" with OTS-only then would OTS have au-
thority under Section 1818(b)(1) to impose a cease and desist order
of any kind. The parties argue extensively as to whether the various
communications between OTS' predecessors and Hickory (or the
individual petitioners) constitute written agreements or conditions
within the meaning of the statute, or whether they should properly
be thought of as more informal understandings. We do not have to
decide this issue, however, because assuming, arguendo, that OTS'
view on this matter (that the agreements to stipulate are conditions
imposed in writing) is correct, we agree with petitioners that OTS
184. Id. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
If... the agency has reasonable cause to believe that the depository institu-
tion or any institution-affiliated party... [is violating or has violated,] or the
agency has reasonable cause to believe that the depository institution or any
institution-affiliated party is about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation, or
any condition imposed in writing by the agency in connection with the grant-
ing of any application or other request by the depository institution or any
written agreement entered into with the agency, the agency may issue and
serve upon the depository institution or such party a notice of charges in
respect thereof .... [T]he agency may issue and serve upon the depository
institution or the institution-affiliated party an order to cease and desist from
any such violation or practice. Such order may, by provisions which may be
mandatory or otherwise, require the depository institution or its institution-
affiliated parties to cease and desist from the same, and, further, to take af-firmative action to correct the conditions resulting from any such violation or
practice.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) provides in
pertinent part:
Affirmative action to correct conditions resulting from violations or prac-
tices. The authority to issue an order under this subsection and subsection
(c) of this section which requires an insured depository institution or any
institution-affiliated party to take affirmative action to correct or remedy
any conditions resulting from any violation or practice with respect to which
such order is issued includes the authority to require such depository institu-
tion or such party to-
(A) make restitution or provide reimbursement, indemnification, or guar-
antee against loss if-
(i) such depository institution or such party was unjustly enriched in con-
nection with such violation or practice; or
(ii) the violation or practice involved a reckless disregard for the law or
any applicable regulations or prior order of the appropriate Federal bank-
img agency.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (1994) (emphasis added).
185. Wachtel, 982 F.2d at 586.
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wholly lacked authority to issue the order directing petitioners to
pay the government $5.3 million.' 86
In short, while the OTS can enter into written agreements with the
managers and owners of a savings bank, enforcement of these agree-
ments is constrained by immutable rules set forth in the underlying
statutory scheme. Without enforceable agreements, however, an en-
forced self regulation regime, whether directed at depository institu-
tions or their lawyers, is meaningless.
Indeed, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the OTS was even
less successful at articulating clear and enforceable standards for at-
torney conduct than enforcing standards for depository institution
conduct. In one of the most notorious cases of alleged attorney mis-
conduct, the Kaye, Scholer law firm demonstrated its recalcitrance
very early on in the Lincoln Savings matter (much of it stemming from
the firm's failure to distinguish between conduct that was possibly ap-
propriate in litigation and conduct that was appropriate in a bank ex-
amination). 87 The firm's recalcitrance with regulators should have
triggered a reprimand from the FHLBB and, if Kaye, Scholer per-
sisted, the FHLBB perhaps should have insisted that Lincoln hire an-
other law firm or face increased regulatory scrutiny. 188 Such gradual
186. Id. at 583-84.
187. Very early on in the representation, Peter Fishbein assumed an aggressive pos-
ture toward the FHLBB, condemning the "abusive and costly" policies of the FHLBB
and insisting that the FHLBB make all future requests for information through Kaye,
Scholer, a request that the FHLBB saw as a "fundamental misunderstanding of the
examination process." Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved,
Am. Law., May 1992, at 68, 70 (citation omitted), cited in W. Frank Newton, A Law-
yer's Duty to the Legal System and to a Client: Drawing the Line, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev.
701, 703 (1994); see also Susan Beck, Keating's Bouncer, Am. Law. Jan.-Feb. 1990, at
40 (describing how Kaye, Scholer repeatedly threatened the FHLBB with lawsuits in
order to deflect a regulatory crackdown on Lincoln).
There is no reason why federal regulators, particularly those regulating financial
institutions in which the vast majority of deposits are insured by the federal govern-
ment, should have to put up with a "lawyer as bouncer" mentality. In the private
sector, there would be an immediate repercussion if an insured firm's lawyers were to
treat a private insurance company like an unwelcome patron at a bar-for example,
by refusing to allow the insurer on the premises for a safety inspection-cancellation
of the insurance policy.
188. Prior to August 1995, the OTS used a "revised attorney letter," which the OTS
required a depository institution to send to its counsel as part of a regular examina-
tion. In this letter the institution asked its lawyer to confirm that the attorney would
respond in accordance with applicable rules of professional conduct to any issue that
might arise in connection with conflicts of interest, the institution's compliance with
laws or regulations, and fiduciary duties or principles of safety and soundness. The
letter also provided that if the attorney did not provide the requested confirmations,
the examiner would take this failure into account in its evaluation of the institution.
See Lieberman, Professional Conduct, supra note 130, at 632-34; Revised Attorney
Letter, OTS Transmittal No. 113, at 3 (June 24, 1994), reprinted in ABA Ad Hoc
Committee on OTS Attorney Inquiry Letters, Guidance for Lawyers Responding to
the OTS Revised Attorney Letter, 50 Bus. Law. 607, 629 (1995). Over two and one-half
years, an ABA Ad Hoc Committee reviewed numerous drafts of the revised attorney
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escalation of enforcement efforts was not the chosen strategy, how-
ever. Kaye, Scholer was not reprimanded or removed from the exam-
ination. As a result, the OTS found itself confronting alleged lawyer
misconduct that it believed warranted extreme sanctions.
By contrast, Ayres and Braithwaite point out that an effectively en-
forced self-regulation regime makes a range of sanctions available
either to deter misconduct, to incapacitate perpetrators of misconduct,
or both, depending on which is appropriate.1' 9 Indeed, regulatory ac-
tion should mostly occur at the "base" of an "enforcement pyra-
mid"'9 with persuasion and occasional warning letters being the
predominant response to relatively minor breaches. 91 Ayres and
Braithwaite cogently argue that availability of high potency but rarely
used maximum sanctions, the "benign big gun," at the top of the en-
forcement pyramid has a deterrent effect that pushes actual enforce-
ment responses down to the base of the pyramid. 92
Making such a range of sanctions available to regulators is critical to
the effective regulation of lawyers as well as their clients. Many differ-
ent levels of offenses are possible, but, if only a few different types of
punishments are available, there may not be a politically acceptable
means to punish the less serious offenses and punishments for the
more serious offenses may not be severe enough. 193 For example, if
regulators can only suspend or disbar lawyers from practice before
their agency, offenses that do not merit such severe sanctions will
most likely go unpunished. Availability of and willingness to use sanc-
tions, such as a public reprimand or imposition of remedial measures
on a law firm, thus can be critical to assuring that less serious offenses
are addressed as well. Otherwise, these offenses may evolve into
more serious offenses as the lawyers continue to disregard appropriate
standards of professional conduct. At the other end of the spectrum,
a regulatory agency may not be able to deter egregious lawyer con-
duct if the agency is not empowered to bring civil actions against law-
yers for monetary damages.
letter, met with OTS representatives, and discussed issues raised by the OTS drafts.
Lieberman, Professional Conduct, supra note 130, at 631-33.
189. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 35.
190. Id. Ayres and Braithwaite adopt Braithwaite's original argument that an
agency's enforcement efforts are most effective if the agency explicitly displays an
enforcement pyramid with a variety of regulatory responses, from less severe re-
sponses at the bottom of the pyramid to more severe responses toward the top: per-
suasion, warning letters, civil penalties, criminal penalties, license suspension, and
license revocation. Id; John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of
Coal Nine Safety 182 (1985). Of course, different enforcement pyramids are appro-
priate for different regulatory contexts, such as health and safety, environmental, and
banking regulation.
191. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 35-36.
192. Id at 40-44.
193. Id at 37.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Regulators are far more likely to be effective disciplinarians of law-
yers if they impose milder and more predictable sanctions earlier in
their relationship with recalcitrant lawyers. This more measured ap-
proach to lawyer discipline would in turn encourage lawyers to accept
regulators' authority over the bar as well as over regulated firms. Mu-
tual respect could eventually replace the current atmosphere of mu-
tual recrimination.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the function of regulatory lawyers within
two paradigms: a paradigm of "games" between regulators, regulated
firms, and lawyers; and a paradigm that allows for contractual "bar-
gaining" between these various players. Neither the game theoretic
nor the contractual paradigm completely describes the relationship
between lawyers and regulators. These two paradigms, however, pro-
vide a cohesive analysis of the actual, and especially of the potential,
role of lawyers in the regulatory process.
Regulatory agencies have an opportunity to play rule-making and
enforcement "games" with lawyers to encourage gatekeeping and dis-
courage antisocial conduct. Regulatory agencies also have an oppor-
tunity to strike "bargains" with lawyers that will influence lawyers'
behavior. Unfortunately, regulators have used relatively ineffective
strategies for regulating the legal profession including: (i) relying on
vague implied understandings that they believe they have arrived at
with lawyers instead of actually negotiating with individual lawyers or
groups of lawyers; (ii) starting at the top of the enforcement pyramid
and relying too much on the occasional "big stick" to punish egregious
defection instead of more measured responses to minor incidents; and
(iii) failing to communicate to lawyers that lawyer choice of a cooper-
ative strategy in lawyer/regulator games will be rewarded with
favorable regulatory treatment of the lawyers' clients.
This Article suggests that regulators: (i) clearly signal their willing-
ness to play cooperative "game" strategies with firm lawyers who will
themselves play cooperative strategies and (ii) adopt a more coherent
and explicit "contractarian" approach to the regulation of lawyers.
Using the consent decrees that agencies currently negotiate with recal-
citrant law firms as a model, regulators could initiate an enforced self
regulation regime in which lawyers and regulators, before any miscon-
duct occurs, negotiate specific standards for lawyer conduct.
Although default rules in codes of professional responsibility could be
supplemented by a few new rules imposed by regulators, most new
rules governing lawyers should be negotiated by regulators and law-
yers. These rules should be both explicit and understandable, with
predictable sanctions for breach. Such rules can then be vigorously
yet fairly enforced by regulators ex post.
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